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This is a fact-find hear to r in ion, 
to ask questions, to work oil that 
has spilled and to it Our ls 
are three-fold. First, it is serious the 
toxic contamination s been to 
clean up. Also, it is to at actions 
that will be needed to correct the a 
at job latory 
agencies are doing. Obviously, ical 
accident even happened is testimony current stem is 
inadequate. 
Finally, it is to ask re s il 
Shell Oil has for these events, and to a try is 
acting with all due dil to lls like this 
in California. 
Our coast 1 , from San D to our 
waterways are too important to be to us as 
industrial sewers. We as li s a re s ility to 
be activists to protect these crit al natural resources, not 
only for ourselves, but for rat s. 
I hope we can beg the necess steps 
needed to repair the damage especial to 
prevent it from happening aga 
Senator Boatwright. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: F st I would 1 to thank Senator 
Torres for bringing the Senate Tox s ttee to Martinez. I 
felt it was important; I discussed it th h because the 
3 
ramifications of is i 1 ar borders of Contra 
2 
Costa and Counties, ich was so dama by the spill. 
He s ined this hearing, and that's 
~ 
to find out why it it was not discovered earlier; 
what's been done to c But more important than that, 
out of this , and t that Legislature holds 
7 
are general ' is to a nat as to whether or 
not State laws are or not we should have 
new State laws 1 mit or insofar as humanly 
() 
possible this type of spill. 
ll 
It's my that out of is hear we will have a 
12 
recommendation for some sort of warn stem that will, 
'f' l- this ever occurs aga 1 be accidents, obviously, 
~ 
somewhere, somet i we warning system, 
) this spill or the 11 wou have been 
a We cou it after a fe\v 
7 s and it 
X a to i cons le time before 
9 it was dis 
So 0 all 
..,, Cali ia an ear warn tern if there is a loss of 
Y) oil outs ta area. I at would be, 
23 perhaps, best ha we could do out of this hearing to 
prevent these i ing in in California. 
2.'\ ng to Mart z and to Contra Costa 
Coun 
27 CHAIRMAN TORRES: Senator Keene. 
2X 
4 
SENATOR KEENE: Yes, I live across the Straits in 
Benicia, a little bit from where Senator Boatwright is and a 
little bit downstream from Assemblyman Hannigan, who shares 
Solano County with me. 
5 
We were fortunate in some relative sense that the Shell 
6 
Martinez Oil refinery spill drifted west towards San Pablo Bay 
7 
and away from the far more environmentally sensitive and wildlife 
rich Suisun Marsh and Grizzly Bay. 
But the destruction that was done that will be 
:n recounted, the 100-acre marsh for water fowl nesting, the killing 
! I 
of many birds and small mammals, and the standstill in sport 
!2 fishing marina operations and yachting, all of these things will 
be recounted here so I will allude to them now. 
l4 Now, in addition to being a Senator from the area and a 
l'i Chairman of the Joint Committee on Fisheries, I represent five 
16 coastal counties, extending, as I mentioned, from Carquinez up to 
17 the Oregon border, that Senator Torres alluded to. So, I'm not 
lX only concerned about the very important Bay/Delta estuary system, 
!9 including the marshes and the wetlands that are associated with 
2() it, but I'm also concerned about its implications for the Reagan 
21 Administration's aggressive pursuit of an oil and gas lease sale 
in Northern California ocean waters. 
::'.\ All of this is related. It doesn't really m~tter if the 
24 oil is spilled from a tanker, or a barge, a ship, an oil 
refinery, or a storage tank. The oil has the same affect: it 25 
coats and kills birds, and fish, and larvae, and nutrients in the 
.,7 _, food chain; it coats the boat bottoms; it fouls the marsh 
::'X habitats and the beaches. 
5 
So is a microcosm of 
would blowout or a 
tanker ace reacherous ocean waters 
4 
off of the Coa t f Ca There is no oil spill 
equipment as there is the San Francisco Bay Area. 
The Mart e shows a c le of things. 
7 First, that ace s are unavo , and the technology for 
cleanup is fici le s , if it works 
c) so here, it won't a re. It would be the 
() death knell for the fisheries, the tourist ec , and the 
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recent oil spill near Martinez, I 
believe you missed a larger point. 
"If a long-established, sta-
tionary oil facility can't guarantee 
against oil spills, what can we 
reasonably expect from the 5,000 
tanker trips in and out of San 
Francisco Bay that are anticipated 
from North Coast oil developments?" 
In other words, the Bay, the North Coast, and the Delta are 
integrally related in all of this. The writer goes on to say: 
"One serious spill from one 
tanker would result in permanent 
damage that would make the Shell 
incident seem trivial by comparison." 
I don't know if that's true, but that's what it says. 
"This is especially relevant 
since the Interior Department's 
decision to begin the North Coast 
leasing program is being made now, 
and the Shell incident serves as 
graphic evidence of the folly of 
North Coast development. I don't 
think a short-term oil supply is 
worth the disfigurement of our 
North Coast, San Francisco Bay 
and the destruction of the coast's 




















It's signed a i o San rancisco. 
So, we're th along same lines that what 
happens here is very much a microcosm of what could happen on the 
North Coast. And fact rs would move through 
the Bay area, San Francisco Bay, could mean that you'll 
be holding hear s area n th very much worse 
experiences than are goi to be related 
Assemb Ma or Leader Hann 
ASSEMBLYMAN HANNIGAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I wanted to also thank you for your timely reaction to 
incident calling th Also for holding it in 
Martinez, and f 1 me and so many other 
Assembly Members who are s and represent 
ions of the area. 
The e at Shell fact be 
ic s this portion 
of Bay area. a r f manufacturing facilities 
who are loc a are dependent to 
some extent needs, and at the 
same time, ly sensitive areas. 
So, I s we not on review what 
happened on April 23rd and s to that, but that we focus 
our pr at tent on how to avo the next accident, if 
possible, and if fact ace s are to happen, that we 
can min ze and t them. Because as I say, we are blessed 
















on the Contra Costa side, but on both sides of the Bay, and 
certainly up in this North Bay area. 
8 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Our first witness is the Vice Mayor. 
I must say, it's always a pleasure to be in Northern 
California and especially in this community. The reason we chose 
Martinez was quite accidental: it was the day after the Cinco de 
Mayo, and why wouldn't a Torres come to Martinez? 
(Laughter.) 
VICE MAYOR POLLACEK: Thank you, Senator Torres. 
The Mayor of Martinez wishes me to offer his regrets for 
not being here. He had planned to be here. He's a Deputy 
District Attorney, and he has higher duties right now in taking 
some of the criminals off our streets and prosecuting them. 
My name is Bill Pollacek. I'm the Vice Mayor of the 
City of Martinez. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Welcome, Mr. Vice Mayor. 
VICE MAYOR POLLACEK: On behalf of the residents and 
City Council of Martinez, I would like to thank the Senate Toxics 
Committee for holding its hearing today in Martinez. I would 
especially like to thank Committee Chairman Art Torres for 
bringing the Committee down to Martinez for this hearing. 
The circumstances which bring the Committee here are 
extremely unfortunate. As you can see, many of us are quite 
concerned about the impact of the oil spill on our environment 
and our water. The spill at the Shell Oil refinery complex is 
the worst environmental disaster of recent memory in the 
Carquinez Straits and Suisun Bay area. The total extent of the 
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10 
"Shell Oil has carried the burden of 
clean-up and shouldered the financial 
responsibility and done an admirable 
job, but strict enforcement will act 
as a reminder that these broken regu-
lations serve an important purpose and 
7 that is to protect the very sensitive 
areas of our coastal environment." 
9 We will enter this as part of the official record. 
10 We also have Supervisor Nancy Fahden who is with us. I 
II believe you represent this district, and we'd like to hear a few 
, words from you. Welcome to the Committee. [_ 
1' 
I \ 
SUPERVISOR FAHDEN: I want to welcome you here to 
1 ~ Martinez and Contra Costa County. I do represent this area and 
this district. 
16 We have been very alarmed at the accident that occurred. 
17 We are looking to working cooperatively with all the State 
!X agencies and the local agencies to seek prevention. We think 
19 that's the key and the clue, and we know that it would be less 
~0 costly if we could have prevention in place rather than to go 
'I after the fact and try to clean up the accidents after they have 
Y) occurred. 
,; It is truly indeed a very great disaster, and it will 
2~ take years and years for the marshlands to restore themselves to 
25 their original beauty that they had. However, we feel that by 
26 working cooperatively with all of the, again, the agencies that I 
27 stated and with the cooperation of Shell Oil Company, and they 
11 
have sed ir I ink we can 
ach that goa . 
We s marshland area the 
Carquinez Straits. I m sure are aware of that. We 
are looking in Contra Costa to have continual monitoring. 
We're ooking what we call a sleuth; someone who has a 
hotline can do da s and the public would 
know where to a sp 1 or an ace if one should occur. 
Ear detection s extreme ause if you 
() 
have early detec , you can spread of the 
i l 
oil as it occurred in i stance. The marshlands 
are not only to the habitat; 're also 
very, very 1 have a cleansing action 
for the It's extreme le for one and all. 
Once for to Contra Costa County. 
j" 
l{J 
certainly res and i and we want 
'VJOrk s you. 
CHAIRMl'"N l ve much, Madam 











Those are the issues that we have before us. For our 
first witness, I'd like to call Captain David Zawadski, who is 
he of the U.S. Coast Guard Command Post for the Martinez Shell 
oil spill. 
Welcome to the Committee, Captain. 
CAPTAIN ZAWADSKI: Good morning. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: You are the first responder usually in 
these types of cases. 
When were you first notified of the oil spill and by 
whom? 
CAPTAIN ZAWADSKI: I don't have the exact date on that. 
It is in our files. It was midafternoon. I don't have the exact 
date. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: April 23rd. 
CAPTAIN ZAWADSKI: On a Saturday. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What is the estimated cleanup schedule 
!7 in this instance, do you think? 
tx CAPTAIN ZAWADSKI: We work in phases. The first phase, 
19 of course, is, we want to contain the spill. That was one of our 
20 first priorities, to stop the spread of the spill, protect the 
2! sensitive areas by priority, and then to remove the oil both by 
,, skimming on the water and vacuuming with vacuum trucks on the 
'I land. 
2-1- And then, as you get the bulk of the oil, you control 















vJe re near that first se where we have 
the movement of are a few ts, primarily on 
Shell Mar water area the collectible oil is, 
the most nonexistent. You do have, due to tide and 
wind conditions, s and somet s some collectible oil corning 
off of hi areas; st impact being from 
Point Edith to the east, and it goes west to right west of 
Martinez. We still have some ing near southern 
line peri ical vJe' ll some slight sheening off 
Dillon Point on s , near Southhampton Marsh, but very 
little on --
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direction. You t s ing as far as Vallejo and the 
Mare Island Strait area. The western most area that we could see 
any s s 's Light House, 
and 've seen, f we we saw a sheen, 
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B , wh 
we 
s a ve 
the d There was a 
lightly detectable discoloration of water, if you will, r 
inside on the mud flats. 




westerly direction, it did collect, and when you 
coming in, and of course the wind lly blows 
tide 
west 
towards the east, it did collect along some of the coves. 
I guess that's my synopsis of 
impacted. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: 
is unrecoverable at is ? 
CAPTAIN ZAWADSKI: It's ve 
that is unrecoverable. My guesst 
out, again this is a st 
did escape that we were not able 
was roughly 20-25 percent of the 
just, you know, a sst 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So how much 
expended at this point in terms of s 
CAPTAIN ZAWADSKI: Shell 
Benic d 
are we 
diff t to s on amount 
of the total amount that 
of total amount 
to s 
e s 
has the Coast Guard 
cleanup s? 
the re ility 
for the cleanup. We have not opened the pollution fund for the 
cleanup, and Shell would have to give that answer. I don't know 
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CHAIRMAN TORRES: Any questions of the Captain by 
Members of the Committee? 
16 
We re 
I understand you have a formal statement. We'll make 
that a part of the official record. 
CAPTAIN ZAWADSKI: I have no particular written 
statement. I've been very busy, myself and my crew, work 
time. 
full 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Then we don't expect one. We 




Any questions of Capta ? 
Thank you very much for taking time to be with us, 
and thank you again for all the work that you and your men and 
women are doing. 
CAPTAIN ZAWADSKI: I might add that probably everything 
20 has good and bad, and this is a mess, but the good part is, 
21 people have really pulled together. The cooperative ir has 
~· probably been fantastic. We've worked very closely, and that's 
23 part of my job as the predesignated federal on scene coordinator 
24 for the coastal area, is to coordinate with various other 
agencies, federal, State and local. We work very close on a 
26 daily basis and a routine basis with EPA, the State agencies, 




















That n is instance is -- I think to say 
it's been super is an understatement, and I want to thank them 
publicly for that. 
SENATOR KEENE irman. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Senator Keene a question. 
SENATOR KEENE: Before ss leaves, will we have 
someone who 
utilized in 
ll be testi i 
cl ? 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Yes. 
SENATOR KEENE F 
I'll hold 
CAPTAIN ZAWADSKI: f 
later, they can ld o me. 
as to technology that has been 
I wanted to ask questions, but 
have any stions for me 
I'll be ad to return. 







irector, Office of Health and 
Protection Agency. 
, Senator Torres, Committee 
I have a red tatement you 1 me to read 
it now? 
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their hearts what s 
't 
EPA has since 
I 't 1 
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MS. SHIMMIN: , I m i not on terms of 
the title you announced me I'm also EPA's i rson 
of Regional Response Team, i s a of 
ies and State sentatives has juri 
event of an oil or materials spill. We take our i 
the National Contingency Plan, which is a regulation under the 
Superfund and also associated with the Clean Water Act. 
So, what I'm here to tell you is not only the planning 
part of EPA's response as well as the on scene observations from 
inspectors and others. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Excellent. 
MS. SHIMMIN: EPA has interest in, under the Clean Water 
Act, in the SPCC program, the Spill Prevention Control and 
Countermeasure program, which is specific to the oil containment 
in the tank that leaked. 
Basically under that particular provision of Clean 
Water Act, there is a requirement that there be an engineered 
plan to have berms, whatever else, to conta the contents the 
tank, and that the capacity be sufficient to contain all the 
contents, In the event of a failure of the , there be 
operating procedures that prevent the spill of oil 
waterways. 
In this particular instance, we did have a plan that 
Shell had submitted in 1984, and that plan was prior to the 
25 completion of the tank that is in question. One of the 
26 requirements of the SPCC program is that whenever there are major 
27 additions to a facility, the plan be updated and there be a 
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, and the plan was 
e of a routine 
an. We did a routine 
inspection at that ime and found no 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: In '84. 
violat s. 
MS. SHIMMIN: 1 84. 
CHAI ank was not re 1n '87 as 
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MS. SHIMMIN: It's not EPA's 
review of each plant. 
I know that that 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: It 
unorthodox. 
MS. SHIMMIN: Fine. 
20 
ice to do an order 
irrespons not 
It is not EPA's practice to do a routine monitor 
each plant. 
of 
We estimate that country-wide there are about 650,000 
facilities. And if this particular region has 10 percent of 
those, that's 65,000 facilities. We have --
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Yes, but that's nationwide. 
MS. SHI~~IN: That's true. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So what good is it to have you and 
your people here if you're not going to inspect or have an 
oversight over what's happen in the areas of jurisdict 
are within your control? 
that 
MS. SHIMMIN: In this particular 
if we have been irresponsive. 
stance, it sounds as 
I tell you, however, that EPA's normal approach to 
things is, we have limited resources and we assign our 
priorities. And we do have inspections that we do on an annual 
basis, but it is some percentage of the total population of 
available facilities. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So how do you determine that? How do 
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CHAIRMAN TORRES.: So cross checks s are not 
done as to which plants 
reports and which ones have not? 
MS. SHIMMIN: Not under this 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: And is 
peri 
some memo 
your office that perhaps that ought to be 
future? 
MS. SHIMMIN: It isn't our plan now. 
t in the 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Well, I think you ought to think about 
it in terms --
MS. SHIMMIN: If you'd like a memo, we'd be happy to 
provide you with one. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I don't want a memo. I'd like a memo 
to come from you to your EPA Director saying that ought to be the 
case. 
It would seem that it would be very easy to cross check 
a computer scan and figure out which plants and facilities 
haven't submitted their three-year periodic report; don't you 
think? 
MS. SHIMMIN: It sounds in concept as if wou be, 
but I'm not prepared to argue the details about 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Neither am I. I'm just prepared to 
argue the policy direction, and perhaps that ought to be a 
recon@endation to you and to your Director, assuming you ink it 
25 is a responsible step to take. 
26 
27 
MS. SHIMMIN: Yes. 
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MS. SHIMMIN: I don't ink on to 
this is through inspect s. 
I think you've some test a 24 warn 
device, or something 1 that. You d to a constant 
device for detection and not rely upon an inspection by an 
inspection to determine such a thing. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Have you already made that as part of 
your recommendation to the Congress, that perhaps we need that on 
a nationwide basis in terms of legislation? 
MS. SHIMMIN: No. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Do you anticipate doing that? 
MS. SHIMMIN: Whether we would make it to the Congress, 
or whether we would go through EPA's normal hierarchy, it 
certainly is -- when we write our report on this particular 
incident, we will have recommendations included in that report. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Goodness! From what you've indicated, 
I wouldn't have too much confidence in normal EPA hierarchy 
because it doesn't seem like they know what's going on. 
MS. SHIMMIN: I can't respond to that. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I didn't anticipate you would 
But the fact of the matter still 1 s in terms of what 
is the responsibility of EPA, to go beyond just being around? 
When we have a major oil spill like this, I would think that you 
would feel extremely responsible in recommending and suggesting 
25 some alternatives that ought to take place. 
You're first suggesting there be an early warning 
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MS. SHIMMIN: , what 
has read in the paper and has been discus at length, there's a 
violation of the NPDES , in had a to 
discharge clean rainwater the di int, 
came out was not clean rainwater. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Does the EPA to recommend to 
the Attorney General that there ought to be prosecution for Shell 
Oil for violations of that law? 
MS. SHIMMIN: We have attorneys assigned to this 
particular incident. We have been in discuss s th the u.s. 
Attorney, and we've been in discussions with the State A.G.'s 
Office, and we're in the process of evaluating our enforcement 
strategy at this time. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Well, my goodness! If even the papers 
know what happened, as you said, so obvious has happened 
is there are violations that have occurred under the Act, doesn't 
the Department of Justice anticipate some prosecution in this 
area? 
MS. SHIMMIN: Of course. I didn't -- I believe I said 
just that. I said we are the process of discuss th all 
of these concerned enforcement arms, enforcement future. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What has been 
MS. SHIMMIN: Obviously there is a violation. How it 
gets turned into an enforcement action is the subject of 
discussion with the State and with the u.s. Attorney, Department 
of Justice. 
27 
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14 
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16 
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o course. We 
IX 
have ta taken c 1 actions. 
s and civil 
act 
MS. of en 
s ons re are nistrat 
ties; there a s re are criminal 
24 penalt s. 
25 CHAI r from testimony that 
26 the EPA's tent extent of law when 
,, 
-I 

















MS. SHIMMIN: That certainly is my understanding. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Is that your suggestion to the U.S. 
Attorney's Office as well? 
MS. SHIMMIN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So you have suggested to the U.S. 
28 
Attorney's Office that Shell Oil be prosecuted to the full extent 
of the law? 
MS. SHIMMIN: We have suggested that to a number of 
different forums, including the State A.G.'s Office, the U.S. 
Attorney, and our own headquarters. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So, it is the policy of EPA that when 
these kinds of discharges occur, that the responsible parties be 
prosecuted to the full extent of the law? 
MS. SHIMMIN: Of whatever law seems to be the most 
pertinent, yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right. 
Senator Boatwright. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: My concern is that if Shell did not 
file their three-year update report, and that was not caught, and 
we're now into the fourth year, we have Chevron; we have 
Wickland; we have Unical; we have Tosco; we have Sealand. Across 
the way we have a Hummel plant. 
I'm just wondering if maybe we shouldn't review your 
records to make a determinate as to whether or not these other 
plants have or have not filed their timely reports, because 
another spill from one of these other groups at this time or any 
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SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: D 
had not been reported? 
MS. SHIMMIN: Yes, we 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Is 
you 
add 
check with the other oil refineries on 
tanks 
1 v s 
Bay to see if they 




MS. SHIMMIN: We are in the process of evaluating that. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: It would seem to me that would be a 
very serious violation as opposed to perhaps just simply not 
giving you the three-year plan. It would be a more serious 
violation. 
MS. SHIMMIN: You bet. That certainly is true. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Also, if I might suggest, and I 
think this is one of the big things we're going to focus on as 
indicated by the Chairman, we need a warning system. these 
types of systems have been allowed to even be in existence, and I 
1 ~ had no knowledge of this -- I'm sure this Committee d t -- but 
IX the experts in the field who have the responsibility for 
19 oversight and reviewing the plans should certainly by now have 
20 
~I 
recommended, either by regulation or by specific law, 
be some sort of early warning system. 
22 Do you have anything in mind that you're going to 
there 
23 recommend to Congress, to whom you're responsible as the EPA, for 
24 legislation that will require an early warning system so we don't 
25 get a hundred and X thousand gallons of oil rather than, say, a 
2h few gallons or a few thousand before that warning is sounded? 
27 
31 
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SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Is there not also a regulat 
prevents the opening of the valve that was opened during 
ing rain storms? 
MS. SHIMMIN: Yes, is the of their 
operating plan, to leave that valve open; you're right. 
32 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: So that's one violation, that 
someone made a conscious decision to open the valve during an 
impending rain storm. And I understand that was specifically the 
reason for doing it, was to drain the rainwater off the roof in 
case it rained. 
MS. SHIMMIN: One could do that if one monitored the 
system to be sure that oil didn't get into the waterway. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Okay, but if you have 200 of these 
big tanks sitting around, or literally thousands up and down this 
Strait, to monitor each one would be difficult. 
That's why I'm suggesting that maybe an early warning 
system, some sort of electronic or mechanical system, would be a 
lot easier and then back it up with visual inspection, on site 
inspection. 
I think we cannot continue to rely upon visual 
inspection. I think we're going to have to probably -- the EPA 
doesn't sound like they have any definite plans, so I'm going to 
suggest that out of this, the State's probably going to have to 
enact laws to require an early warning system other than a human 
visual type system. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: We have a basic problem here, because, 
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MS. SHIMMIN: a registered neer signs off on 
plan, and that was indeed done for is 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: 1 r let me tell what 
also requires under fede law It ires there be: 
"High liquid level alarms with an 
audible or visual signal at a 
7 constantly manned operation 
II 
not a maybe manned, not a sometimes manned, 
') 
"a constantly manned operation 
J() or surveillance station; in smaller 
II plants an audible air vent may 
1.! suffice." 
Did that take place at this tank? 
14 MS. SHIMMIN: No, and the tank was not included in the 
15 plan, so that in the particular plan, the details of this tank's 
16 operation weren't even described. 
17 CHAIRMAN TORRES: Well the problem is, what we're trying 
IX to point out here is, we don't need any new federal laws. We 
llJ need different people to enforce them. That seems to be the 
problem here. 
"Considering size and complexity 
..,, of the facility, high liquid level 
pump cutoff devices set to stop flow 
at a predetermined tank content 
25 level." 
That's federal law; right? 
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I would add to that that re was a routine ion 
in 1984, and at that time 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: But in 984, wasn't 
from your testimony. 
MS. SHIMMIN: That's true. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: A routine inspection of a foundation 
and there's no house built is not an inspection of termites. 
It's the inspection of a foundation. 
MS. SHIMMIN: Any time you have an inspection scheme, 
there is a built-in probability that you're not going to catch 
everything. You don't inspect --
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Yes, but federal law says you have to 
have a fail-safe operation. 
MS. SHIMMIN: That's true. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Not a maybe it works; not a maybe 
might work; but a fail-safe operation. 
MS. SHIMMIN: You're right, and without a fail-safe 
operation, you have a violation. There is a violation here. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What violation is there in terms of 
not submitting the report in the first place? Is there an 
enforcement mechanism for those people that don't even submit a 
report in the first place? 
I'll ask the people from Shell later on that question. 
I'm sure they have a prepared answer. 
But nonetheless, is there a provision for enforcement 
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CHAIRMAN TORRES: We appreciate 
Assemblyman Hannigan. 
ASSEMBLYr-1AN HANNIGAN: Ms. Sh n, I'd 1 to go 
to your jurisdiction, if I may, for a moment so I unders 
scope of it with respect to the SPCCs. 
MS. SHIMMIN: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HANNIGAN: There are how many such plans 
within your jurisdiction? The figure I heard was 65,000. 
MS. SHIMMIN: It has been estimated nationwide that 
there are 650,000 facilities that would require SPCC plans. 
38 
II We have had over the years -- and not everyone notifies 
12 that they are subject to having an SPCC plan. We do such things 
I \ 
1-+ 
as on site inspections in certain concentrated areas to determine 
whether or not a facility is required to have an SPCC plan and if 
,~ yes, if they do. We do over flights to look at -- in areas of 
IG the country to look at tank storage in remote areas, and then we 
17 follow that up with on the scene inspections. 
IX So, we have had over the years a deliberate policy of 
9 attempting to identify the locations of facilities that are 
20 likely candidates as needing SPCC plans, and following that up 
21 with specific inspections. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HANNIGAN: What is your jurisdiction? Is it 
'; all of California? 
MS. SHIMMIN: Region 9, I represent the Environmental 
25 Protection Agency in Standard Federal Region 9, which is 
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11? Or is it a rather extensive document that s into some 
detail on how they operation and 
avoiding the kinds of spills 
MS. SHIMMIN: The 
complexity of the facility, but 
itself. There is 
their plans are for 
? 
var s depending the 
re is a diagram of the tank 
ASSEMBLYMAN HANNIGAN: This kind of thing? This is a 
roof. 
MS. SHIMMIN: Right. 
There would be some some indication of the slope and 
the direction to a waterway, because the purpose of this 
provision is to prevent the oil from going into a navigable 
waterway. There would be operating procedures that describe how 
the berm, or whatever other device is being operated, to prevent 
the passage of the oil into the navigable water. 
And so, in terms of number of pages, that would depend 
upon how complex the facility we're dealing with is. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HANNIGAN: The regulations provide standards 
for rainwater drainage which include the sealing of bypass 
valves, inspection of runoff rainwater, bypass valves to be 
opened and resealed under responsible supervision, and adequate 
records to be kept. Those are some of the regulations. 
MS. SHIMMIN: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HANNIGAN: And you said that it would be 
difficult if not impossible by regular inspections to catch some 
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ASSEMBLYMAN HANNIGAN: Well now, that s an interesting 
one. 
Let me ask you this: Does istration 
budget annually inc adequate en resources only to 
reduced by the Congress in their deliberations? 
MS. SHIMMIN: Without really responding to that sort of 
administration question, I would point out to you that we have 
half a work year of federal time to devote to all of the SPCC 
facilities in our region. And I don't believe --
10 
ASSEMBLYMAN HANNIGAN: I don't want to belabor this. 
Is that a case where you ask for more resources and are 
rejected by the Congress, or is it a case where you don't ask for 
' ' I~ 
more resources, nor do your superiors ask for more resources, and 
14 therefore the Congress is not aware of the gap that exists here? 
MS. SHIMMIN: I think EPA has a track record of always 
asking for more resources than they get. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HANNIGAN: All right. 
!X CHAIR~ffiN TORRES: Senator Keene. 
IY SENATOR KEENE: Do you feel that the under-budgeting is 
:::o deliberate? 
21 MS. SHIMMIN: I believe the establishment of priorities 
22 and assignment of priorities is deliberate. And I think that 
23 there's always going to be the case that agencies ask for more 
24 resources than they get because there's a finite amount of tax 
2) money available to pay. 
SENATOR KEENE: Is there a sense of regulatory laxity 

























MS. SHIMMIN: 's not sense, no. 
SENATOR KEENE: It isn t your sense. Was the accident 
le your j ? 
MS SHIMMIN: Yes. 
SENATOR KEENE: Did Shell fail in its duty to maintain a 
ion? 
MS. SHIMMIN: Yes. 
SENATOR KEENE: Did EPA fail in any duty to make sure 
Shell maintained a safe operation? 
MS. SHIMMIN: No. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: You're very fortunate you're not under 
SENATOR KEENE: What would you have different than what 
the series of ace events leading up to the 
MS. SHIMMIN: If we had more resources to do more 
th we could have -- we certainly 
would ave obse that a major tank was not part of 
the 
SENATOR KEENE: So from your own --
MS. SHIMMIN: So from standpoint, that would have 
been an a rt I 't believe there is anything that EPA could 
have done personally to avoid the accident because there is no 
way that we can be constantly present at every facility to be 
sure the operating ices are being followed. 
SENATOR KEENE: So had the agency been better endowed in 












MS. SHIMMIN: The fact that the plan -- I don't believe 
that it could have been prevented from EPA's standpoint, from 
EPA's own act it s, because could have been added was 
t of the plan including this large tank. We could have caught 
that. 
But there is no way that we could have caught an 
operational error in following the plan unless we just, by 
chance, had happened to be there at the time that the operational 
error was occurring. 
SENATOR KEENE: So if your budget were doubled, you 
could not have prevented this? 
MS. SHIMMIN: I don't believe we could have. I don't 
think there's any way we could have had enough money to prevent 
this particular accident. It happened on a weekend. It's not 
our habit to be making inspections on weekends. 
I just don't see that an inspection approach solely 
would have solved that problem. 
SENATOR KEENE: Based on what you know, what could have 
prevented it? Or could it have been prevented? 
MS. SHIMMIN: It could have been prevented by the 
company. 
SENATOR KEENE: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right. We'll anticipate-- excuse 
me. 
MS. SHIMMIN: Sorry. When you said "all right," I 
thought that was the same as good-bye. 
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46 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All ri 
You will forward to the Committee, if you would please, 
the number of enforcement actions that been taken, at least 
in our region in California under your jurisd ion. 
MS. SHIMMIN: Okay, and that's SPCC enforcement act 
or are you interested in Clean Water Act enforcement --
7 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Both. 
MS. SHIMMIN: Okay. Is there anything else you'd like 
of us? 
10 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: If there is, I'll write to you about 
II 
it. 
SUPERVISOR FAHDEN: May I ask a question? 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I'm sorry, yes, Supervisor. 
SUPERVISOR FAHDEN: I would like to know, and maybe you 
don't have these figures today, the exact number of tanks that go 
!h 
from Richmond to past Tosco along the Carquinez Strait. And I 
17 
would like to know the total number of gallons that are being 
lX 
stored in all of those tanks, and then I would like to know if 
19 
you have an earthquake preparedness plan. 
Senator Torres, I don't expect to get these answers 
~ l 
today, but if she can get them back to us -- unless you have them 
today, it would be interesting. 
MS. SHIMMIN: It would be a miracle if I had all of 
those today. 
25 SUPERVISOR FAHDEN: Well, I think it's important to 
26 understand the magnitude of the problem. Once we can get a 
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48 
MS. SHIMMIN: I'm not prepared to speak about earthquake 
standards so far as construction, no 
SUPERVISOR FAHDEN: Well , Senator, later 
information can be sought and given to the local agency. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Great. 
I think Senator Roberti had a bill to do that in terms 
7 
of creating an inventory across the State, but I believe it died 
in the Assembly. We'll have to resurrect it again. 
It's no reflection on Mr. Hannigan's leadership. It's 
10 
more a reflection of other factors. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Yes, Senator Boatwright. 
~~ 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: I just was talking to Senator 
14 Roberti yesterday about that bill, and he has provided me with a 
I~ 
copy of that bill. 
16 
Out of these hearings, I'm going to probably recommend 
we reintroduce that bill and add provisions requiring an early 
warning system in State law. 
19 I have the print-up here with me, and I'll make it 
:::o available to you later in the day. 
:::1 CHAIRMAN TORRES: Great, thank you. 
~' Last question, has the EPA Regional Office reviewed or 
~, approved a California oil removal contingency plan? 
MS. SHIMMIN: I'm not aware of that particular plan. 
-~ What we have is a State contingency plan for hazardous 
26 materials operations, and we also have the regional contingency 
27 plan which we have just -- which describes the interaction of the 
49 
federal agenc s and the s. And we have just 
reviewed that plan ths and are in the 
process of f iz vers 
4 CHAIRMAN 
MS • SH IMr<HN 
6 I want to be sure 
7 
the answers to these s. 
How will we s? Am I to remember what 
9 we've talked , or 1 \ve a transcript? 
10 CHAIRMAN TORRES: No of course we would not expect you 
II to, given your test 
12 We would like, however, the sor to send us a 
letter with ting, and then 
14 we'll ttee asking specifically 
15 what our needs are. 
16 IvlS to respond. 
17 
lS Senator as st 
19 SENATOR KEENE , a last question. 
20 G the been other oil spills 
ref s the area is most that EPA has 
ever anc s? 
was 98 1 to re your recollection, by 
Shell. 
25 MS SH we a r collision in 




We normally, in the event -- this isn't ing to answer 
your question directly in terms of the dollar amount, but our 
normal procedure is to wi Co as We 
jurisdiction with the Coast Guard in terms of the federal on 
scene coordinator presence and the follow-up enforcement actions, 
depending upon whether the oil spill originates in the coastal 
7 
area, in which case it's in the Coast Guard's jurisdiction, or 
the inland area, in which case it's in our jurisdiction. 
We typically --well, under the Clean Water Act, there's 
10 
a $50,000 maximum penalty plus the cost of the cleanup. There 
II 
are additional provisions in this particular case because of the 
12 
violation of the NPDES permit and the SPCC violations. 
13 
We try to focus not only on a penalty, but the also the 
14 
repair to the environment. I don't know if I were to give you a 
dollar answer, were I to be able to give you a dollar answer, 
16 
whether that would give you the total picture, because we're 
7 equally concerned about the repair and restoration of the 
IX environment. 
19 
SENATOR KEENE: Is it considered, then, that the cleanup 
and, as you put it, repair to the environment, where that's 
21 possible, plus $50,000, which I take it is virtually nothing, is 
,, sufficient to deter the kinds of activities that would create a 
risk to the environment such as occurred here? 
MS. SHIMMIN: (No response.) 
SENATOR KEENE: Maybe you should treat that as 
26 rhetorical, because it seems to me that it obviously is not. 
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MS. SHIMMIN: We done a combination of things that 
and replacement of the include restorat and 
environment, as well as penalt s. 
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is," but you can do it, 
it happens. 
's not the case. I 
icular circumstance, I 
me to speak about the 
at the fact 
11 and have been spills before. 
What we can do and it seems to me one of the liabilities of 
having a ss s that there ills on occasion. You 
52 
want to minimize that, and you want to have operating 
that are followed. 
And the fact is, there's a ill. So, who system 
is iling in that there is a spill on occasion and this one 
happens to be catastrophic. 
SENATOR KEENE: But the enforcement authority, the 
7 effect of a series of these spills will be to transform the Bay 
into something of a cess pool. 
MS. SHIMMIN: That certainly is -- if these types of 
!0 things were to continue, that's the likely outcome. 
I think that it's far more important to focus on 
12 prevention than it is to focus on a reaction to the spill. And 
that is an effort that needs to be intensified, and we are, 
14 indeed, doing it, but there still may be things like this that 
l'i happen. 
Io SENATOR KEENE: Prevention, we should focus on 
7 prevention, and I asked you earlier did Shell fail in its duty to 
lx maintain a safe operation, and who was at fault, and you said 
19 yes, they failed, and it was the company that was at fault. 
So I take it that prevention involves imposing 
.:'I threatened sanctions that are sufficient to deter that kind of 
~~ behavior. And what you tell me is, it's a little bit like having 
~, your dog dump on the pavement. You've got to clean it up; that's 
..: 4 the penalty. When you can't clean it up, well, that's sort of 
25 nature taking its course and society suffers. 
26 I mean, there are no real sanctions here. 
.,..., 
-1 MS. SHIMMIN: What would you propose? 
53 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, I don't know, but what you've 
2 proposed, I mean what the kinds of things that 
don't work, obvious was at fault. 
4 I ss I se stiffer fines. I would propose 
5 a shutdown where it s iate, and I would propose criminal 
6 sanctions where s iate, or even a fee-based 
7 inspection 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All r you very much. 
9 MS. SHIMMIN: You're welcome, thank you. 
10 CHAIRMAN TORRES: Peter , Chairman, California 
II Regional Water Quali Board. 
12 First we re to take a f nute break to let our 
13 stenographer rest for a moment. 
14 f recess was . ) 
15 CHAIRMAN TORRES ttee 11 come back to order. 
16 We 12:3 at the latest. We'll 
17 to move l as we can 
IX Peter i forn l V<Jater 
19 Quality Control Board, James, Executive Officer of the 
20 California 1 l 
MR. SNYDER rman Torres morn As you 
22 know, my name i r. I'm here to represent the 
23 Regional Water 
24 to bring to 
25 through in ast two at to investigation of 

















CHAIRMAN TORRES: Let's stipulate as to what your 
documents indicates to us, and you have been very active, and you 
have been responsive. 
I want to get right down to the very basic question, and 
that is what enforcement actions have been taken by your agency 
against Shell Oil? 
MR. SNYDER: Senator Torres, at this time no specific 
enforcement actions have been taken. The Board will, upon the 
submittal of staff information -- probably within the next month 
-- begin the adjudication process 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Why does it take so long? 
MR. SNYDER: I would imagine the first thing we need is 
accurate information accumulated by the staff and presented to 
the Board in an official Board meeting. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Then let's get down to what 
enforcement actions you could take as a Board in respect to this 
accident? 
MR. SNYDER: It's my understanding right now that under 
the current law as enacted by the State of California, that Shell 
could be responsible for enforcement action by the Board up to 
$10 per gallon of oil spilled that has not been recovered. 
The first thing we need to do, Senator, is to come to 
some agreement about what we feel is not a recovered product. 
And then we can really seriously begin the process of determining 
whether we can assess a penalty based upon that. 
If the Board feels that it's unreasonable for them to 
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of California, brings action in their names against Shell. And 
he can recover up to $25,000 a day and $25 per barrel [sic) as 
opposed to your $10,000 a day and $10 a barrel. 
Is that not true? 
MR. JAMES: That's correct, Senator. 
There's also provision -- excuse me, my name is Roger 
James. I'm the Executive Officer of the Regional Board. 
There's also another provision in the law that if it was 
done intentionally or negligently, those penalties can be as much 
as $20 a gallon spilled if it's referred to the Attorney General, 
or $10 a gallon spilled if it's an action taken by the Regional 
Control Board. 
So there's a dual section in there dealing with only the 
amount recovered; the other is dealing with the amount spilled. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: But the key is that the penalty, 
both for the number of days -- the 10,000 as opposed to 25,000, 
and the $10 as opposed to the $20 -- the penalty is both greater 
with the Attorney General than with the Board. 
Is that not correct? 
MR. JAMES: Yes, sir, it is. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: And the Attorney General, under the 
law, if the suit is brought, is the person required on behalf of 
the people of the State of California to bring that suit. 
Is that not true? 
MR. JAMES: That's correct. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: And the reason I bring that out is, 
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lwoman Radke, any local action 
's fees, and you do 
forth in the law to bring suit. 
State f California has that 
to save you money and also to 
lemen. 
Thank you, Senator Torres. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What do you see in the present 
law in respect to s anct to encourage oil spill 
prevention? 
Senator, are probably three 
at rms of trying to prevent 
ons, and I think you've 
the SPCC ations. 
correct. 
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similar incidents 
One is i 
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MR. JAMES: No, sir, I don't. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Tell us how they should be 
strengthened. 
MR. JAMES: I think we need to eliminate that human 
element that might be a causative factor in a spill. You could 
do in one of two ways. 
One, you can make it mandatory before you release any 
material from within a bermed area, that it can only be done on a 
manual basis. In other words, you cannot have pipes going 
through that are subject to opening or closing of valves, so that 
it would have to be one on a manual basis. 
I think that those are the kind of facilities that you 
may need at some of your smaller tank farms, where you don't have 
them permanently manned, or where you don't have the technical 
expertise that you may have at a refinery. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: How is that different from what's 
already required under federal law, which says: 
" with an audible or visual signal 
at a constantly manned operation or 
surveillance station.~ 
MR. JAMES: I'm saying that you only allow a release 
from that facility under manual control through a pump system. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: In addition to this? 
MR. JAMES: Yes, not through a valving system that would 
drain a bermed area. 
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MR. JAMES: Shell had a plan in place. If they would 
have complied with that plan, this incident wouldn't have 
happened. 
60 
SENATOR KEENE: What was the nature of Shell's failure 
with respect to the failure to comply with the plan? What 
specifically occurred that caused the failure? 
MR. JAMES: Shell, in 1985, submitted plan to us for 
preventing such incidents as this. I'd refer to Attachment D in 
our report, which says that: 
"Non-contaminated storm water collected 
inside tank dike areas is discharged on 
manual control through levee drain valves 
to stormwater containment basins." 
That's the key element. They did not comply with that plan, 
their written plan. 
SENATOR KEENE: They did not do what? 
MR. JAMES: They did not -- they discharged contaminated 
IS stormwater, and it was not under manual control. They had opened 
19 
21 
the valves and let it other than with that manual control system. 
SENATOR KEENE: Do you have any knowledge as to whether 
that failure was a deliberate risk accepted by the company? 
MR. JAMES: I don't have any evidence of that. Our 
23 investigation hasn't produced that as yet. 
SENATOR KEENE: Are you looking for that element, 
25 whether it was a mistake, or whether it was a slip up, or whether 
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Tosco has an oil release prevention monitoring system as 
an integral part of our refinery operations. Our programs 
include metallurgical inspections, include visual inspections of 
the storage tanks, pipelines, inspections on a routine basis. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So you're familiar with the federal 
law, then? 
MR. BORDVICK: Yes, sir, I have certain familiarity with 
the federal law. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: And you follow federal law ad seriatim 
in terms of its application? 
MR. BORDVICK: Yes, Senator. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So you have a high liquid level alarm 
system with an audible or visual signal at a constantly manned 
operation or surveillance station? 
MR. BORDVICK: Yes, Senator. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: How long has that been in operation? 
MR. BORDVICK: Sir, I don't have that information as 
when it first went into operation. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: How many times has it proven to be 
effective? 
MR. BORDVICK: I also don't have that information, 
Senator. You usually don't hear about events, particularly in my 
::; 3 department, when everything goes right. When the alarms 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I'm into good news as well as bad 
::; 5 news. 
MR. BORDVICK: I am, too, and I can report that in this 
27 case, in my case, no news that I have is good news, that the 
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Your next question, Senator, was what action did our 
employees take following the initial identification that there 
was a release? 
What I'd like to describe now briefly is the chronology 
of that afternoon, from the point of discovery at 1:45, if that 
would be helpful. 
In accordance with our response plan, our employees who 
discovered the release immediately notified the night 
superintendent. The night superintendent is the person in charge 
of the refinery during off-hours, such as weekends or at night. 
The night superintendent, again according to the plan, 
initiated actions to contain the oil, find the source of the oil, 
and start cleanup. 
At approximately 2:00P.M., or about 15 minutes later, 
Tosco employees at the Wharf deployed a boom to try to contain 
the oil that they observed. Also at that time, Tosco employees 
were dispatched to look for the possible source of the oil. We 
did not know where the oil was coming from at that point. We 
19 began an emergency call out of additional personnel at their 
~ 0 homes so they could come out and help with the situation. 
21 We set up an emergency command center so we could have 
~) some centralized command for the direction of the operation. 
23 Again, at this time we were unaware of the magnitude or the 
24 source of the oil. 
25 By about 2:15, about a half hour later, we were certain 
26 that the oil was not from our Wharf facilities. We began looking 
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the source of the oil, and that they were resuming -- that they 
were assuming responsibility for the cleanup. 
Then, between 4:00P.M. and 7:00P.M., Shell and Tosco 
coordinated our efforts in combatting the spill in conjunction 
with the agencies and Clean Bay crews. At 7:00P.M., we turned 
over coordination of the activities to Shell in order to have a 
single command. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right, any further questions? 
Senator Boatwright. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: I hope that the press that's here 
heard what this gentleman said. Tosco is a independent refinery, 
and they have had -- because they're in my district, I've 
followed them for a long time when they were tied to Associated 
Flying A, and Phillips, and now they're Tosco, one of the last 
remaining independents. 
And I hope that you people heard what they as a small, 
independent that's been in some financial trouble recently, has 
done. They have complied with the law. They have containment 
berms. They have an early warning system. They responded; they 
pout the booms out that saved the Martinez Marina's boats from 
getting totally screwed up. 
And I hope that the press recognizes that we do have 
companies along the Bay, like Tosco, that are complying with the 
law and, frankly, they should be applauded, because what they did 
here was with their personnel, and they responded as well or 
better than, I think, anyone could anticipate anyone could 
27 respond. They were Johnny-on-the-spot, and I think we're not 
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Why wasn't that plan submitted? 
MR. BANDUCCI: My understanding of the requirements in 
that regard are quite different from those of the EPA 
representative. 
Our SPCC plan, which was described, was first drafted in 
1977 in compliance with federal regulations. That plan has 
indeed been updated every three years. The last update was done 
in October of 1986. A copy of that plan has been submitted to 
your staff. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: When was this tank constructed? What 
year was it constructed? 
MR. BANDUCCI: The tank was constructed in 1984. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: In '84? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, indeed. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So in the periodic report in '84 it 
was not included, but it was included in 1986? 
MR. BANDUCCI: It was included in 1986. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What's the story here? 
Please come forward. 
MS. SHIMMIN: I was advised that we do not have an 
updated plan that includes that tank. If it was submitted in 
~~ 1986, it certainly was not submitted to EPA that I'm aware of. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right. 
Why don't you take a look at their plan that they 
25 submitted. 
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CHAIRMAN TORRES: We're talking about '86, because the 
tank wasn't in existence in '84. 
MR. BANDUCCI: It was under construction in '84. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: It wasn't in existence in 1984. It 
wasn't operational in '84 is, perhaps, much more correct. 
MR. BANDUCCI: You'll find that the plan-- I don't 
recall exactly when the tank was placed into service relative to 
the time of that visit. The tank was constructed and placed into 
service in 1984. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: And it was included as part of your 
periodic report, which was in your testimony, reviewed by the EPA 
person? 
MR. BANDUCCI: The plan was reviewed, yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Who was the person who reviewed it? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I don't know the name of the person. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Do you have access to that 
information? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I believe the records would indicate when 
that visit was made, yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right, so in other words, you 
21 prepared the report; it's there. 
T) Is it put in a desk? Is it in a safe? Where is it 
23 placed? 
24 MR. BANDUCCI: The report's on file. Many people in our 
25 complex have a copy of it, including the operating department who 















CHAIRMAN TORRES: We of course, I would expect that 
the people in ion wou have s of the documents 
that you 's not issue 
The issue ew that document, and did 
that document 84 completion and 
operational t of 's in question? 
MR. BANDUCC I can't speak for the EPA. 
specific. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I'm not ask you to speak for the 
EPA. I'm asking to Shell Oil. That's why you were 
called to testi You are not a sentative of the EPA, and 
I have no suspicions that you be. 
MR. BANDUCCI: All I can do is reiterate what I said. 
The plan was 19 4 a sentative of the EPA at 
our location. 
CHAIRMAN at the tank that is in 
question was It was under construction, 
19 according to 
20 HR. BANDUCC s correct. 
2! CHAIRMAN TORR.ES: And the revised plan in '86, 
include the operational 
23 description of ? 
24 MR. BANDUCC p nc s generic operational 
25 descriptions of al tanks. 








MR. BANDUCCI: It has a figure in there which shows an 
aerial overview of our facility, and you will find on that 
schematic the two tanks in the tank in question. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So it's like a treasure hunt: see if 
you can find it. 
MR. BANDUCCI: No, it's quite clearly there, along with 
the operating procedures that pertain to all tanks in the 
complex. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right, and according those those 
10 tanks, do you have the procedures? Are you familiar with federal 
II law? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I believe so. 
u CHAIRMAN TORRES: And you're familiar with the litany 
14 that I've repeated consistently throughout this hearing as to the 
15 requirements under federal law regarding tank installations? 
16 MR. BANDUCCI: I believe I am. 
17 CHAIRMAN TORRES: And you're also familiar that 
1x according to this federal law, it requires that the installation 
IY of new and old tanks be fail-safe engineered or updated into a 
::o fail-safe engineered installation. 
21 Is it your testimony that the tank met that standard? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, it is. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Is it your testimony that a high 
24 liquid level alarm with an audible or visual signal at a 
25 constantly manned operation or surveillance station described 
::'6 your tank? 




























CHAIRMAN TORRES: Was onal at the time of the 
spill? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, it was. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: why d it take Bordvick and 
other people to f out you were leaking? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I point out, the tank did not 
overfill. The strumentation to which you're referring is very 
specific as to appurtenances are required on the tank. This 
tank's had all of those appurtenances. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So this formation that's required by 
federal law does not detect llage or leaking? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Not of type t occurred, Senator. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So that these requirements that we're 
talking about are insufficient to take care of your problems 
then? 
MR. BANDUCC : That s others to assess. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES I would cons to have been 
your response. 
Now, I understand welded steel oil storage 
tanks are to be lt in accordance American Petroleum 
Institute Standard 65 Are you l th that standard? 
MR. BANDUCCI: so, yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I'm ? 
MR. BANDUCC : Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: are. 
ires manufacturer of each tank And this 





















as-built data sheet. And this is for the purpose of showing 
compliance. 
Is that correct? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, sir. 
74 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Do you have a certification letter and 
data sheet? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I believe those documents to be 
available. I don't have them with me here this morning. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: But they do exist? 
MR. BANDUCCI: To the best of my knowledge they do. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: We've received a letter of acceptance, 
but no certification letter. 
Why is that? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I can't answer that, sir. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Who was the person who submitted this 
to us? One of Shell Oil Company's representatives, who was that 
representative? Bob Bowen, does that sound familiar? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What does he do at your plant? 
MR. BANDUCCI: He's the facility support superintendent 
for the complex. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Did he talk to you about what he 
should give us or not give us? 
MR. BANDUCCI: He did not talk to me specifically about 
what you had requested or what he had provided. He had personal 
contact with your staff yesterday, and I believe he met the 























CHAIRMAN TORRES: No he didn't, because I wanted a 
certificat t it. 
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, I'll pursue that. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So you don't know why it was not 
submitted to us? 
MR. BANDUCCI: No, s 
75 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: EPA regulations state that all tank 
installations, as we've indicated, should be fail-safe, but you 
don't have a system whereby leakages are encountered in that 
system at this point? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I'm not sure I understood your question, 
Senator. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: You to me that we can detect when a 
tank overflows, can't detect if it's leaking. 
MR. BANDUCCI: Not by any automatic instrumentation; 
's correct. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Nor trumentation 
a visual ? 
MR. BANDUCCI: That s correct. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: 
Tosco? Is a Tosco Oil 
He's still 
Where did he go? 
him as well. 
kind of alarm 
Now Bordvick, are you still here from 
representative still here? 
from all your praise, Senator. 
went back to work. We'll have to ask 
tern do you have to warn you and 




MR. BANDUCCI: We have no specific alarm systems to warn 
us about oil spills. We design the facilities to preclude this 
kind of occurrence. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Then what went wrong, in your opinion? 
MR. BANDUCCI: What went wrong was two simultaneous 
6 
events. There was obviously a failure of the internal drain 
7 
system from the roof of this tank. We have a sketch here today, 
if you'd care to look at it with me. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Yes, we would. Is that a sketch of 
l(l the tank or the area? 
II MR. BANDUCCI: This is Mr. Bill Sharkey. Bill, let's 
12 get the sketch of the tank. 
We have hard copies that are available. I'm not sure if 
1-t your staff has them yet. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: We do. I just wanted to make sure 
I <• that the audience could go along with us. That's kind of hard to 
17 see. 
IX How are you doing on that report, Ms. Shimmin? 
I') MS. SHIMMIN: I'm looking at it right now. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: It's being looked at right now, good. 
SENATOR KEENE: You said there were two failures. 
'' CHAIRMAN TORRES: Senator Keene. 
,, 
_.1 SENATOR KEENE: You said there was a simultaneous 
2-t failure of two things? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, sir 


















MR. BANDUCCI: I'd to proceed to describe both of 
those for you r now 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: don't we just go ahead with your 
description of --
MR. BANDUCCI: Okay, what this sketch shows is a 
schematic or the tank in question. It's a floating roof tank. 
Rain water accumulates on the roof of this tank into a 
sump, which is attached to the roof. That sump is further 
attached to a flexible metallic hose, of which I have a sample 
here today and I'll be happy to show it to you. That hose 
interconnects with a valve at the base of the tank. 
The rain water passes through the sump, the flexible 
hose, through the valve and into a collection hump. From that 
collection hump it passes to a stormwater collection system 
which collects water from the roof as well as from the perimeter, 
around the That water, along with the roof 
water s to a common collection pipe. It passes out to a 
valve at the dike, which runs around the tank. 
The first failure was within the tank, part of that 
col tion hose system. And I'd like to show you what that hose 
looks 1 I have a s of it. It's constructed of an 
arti ated sta less steel hose, sheathed with a nylon compound. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Was is the product that produced the 
~ damage? 
25 MR. BANDUCC : That was the hose that is schematically 
26 shown there. Exactly what failed I can't tell you, because the 














Whether the hose failed, or whether failed at its 
attachments to the sump or the valve is an open question at this 
point. 
The second failure, in addition to that mechanical 
failure 
SENATOR KEENE: How do you know it failed? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Because that's the only way oil could 
leak out of that valve to the base of the tank. 
The second failure is the one that's already been 
addressed, and that valve at the outlet of the dike was opened. 
It should have been closed. 
A combination of those two circumstances allowed oil 
from the tank to get outside of the dike area and ultimately into 
the Slough. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Senator Boatwright. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: As I understand it, the failure 
that could be anticipated was the opening of the valve, because 
there was fear of an impending storm that would cause water to 
collect on the roof, and they wanted it to drain off and the 
valve was opened. And because of the failure of the hose, oil 
from the tank got into the hose that normally would drain the 
water from the roof, the rain water, and that's how this 
occurred. 
Is that correct? 
MR. BANDUCCI: That's correct, Senator. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: It's also my understanding that the 


















left open, and that is a 
supposed to be left open if 
they are manual attended. 
Is correct? 
lat of regulations; they're not 
is an impending rain, unless 
MR. BANDUCCI: That's not correct, Senator. 
79 
There are two cr ical valves here. There is the valve 
at the base of the tank which is normally open. That's open so 
that when rain water accumulates on the tank, it is drawn off as 
it accumulates: otherwise, you run the risk of the roof of the 
tank, which floats on the oil, sinking, which is another 
environmental problem. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: All right. 
MR. BANDUCCI: So that valve was and should be open to 
drain water. 
The second valve, wh 
be closed. 
is the valve at the dike, should 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: All r 
MR. BANDUCCI: And should only, according to our written 
procedures, be opened after spection of any impounded water 
within the dike area. If that water is clean and there is an 
absence of , it is permissible to open the valve. 
That was the that was open which should not have 
been. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Is that in contravention of any 
25 regulations or 
26 MR. BANDUCCI: That contradicts our written procedure in 
27 terms of operating ans and procedures. It also contradicts our 
28 SPCC plan, which has been described to you. 
80 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: And I'm sure that's probably what 
you're focusing on, is to determine who and why that was opened? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Indeed, that's the subject of an 
intensive internal investigation. It's an investigation that's 
s being conducted outside of my direction. That's on purpose. 
6 
It's being conducted by very trained professionals from other 
7 
parts of the Shell organization, both from our head office and 
other manufacturing locations who have a lot of experience on the 
design and operation of this type of system. 
10 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: I have no further questions. 
ll 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Senator Keene. 
11 
SENATOR KEENE: You seem to be suggesting that there 
13 
were simultaneous failures that were rather coincidental; that 
14 
there was a mechanical failure of the internal drain system on 
lS 
the roof of the tank. The failure may not have been on the roof, 
16 
but it was that system. 
17 
MR. BANDUCCI: That's correct. 
IX SENATOR KEENE: And a human failure in leaving the valve 
19 
open so that the dike was penetrated? 
20 MR. BANDUCCI: The valve at the dike should have been 
21 closed. It was open. 
SENATOR KEENE: I described it as a human failure; is 
that not correct? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Human beings work at the facility, and 
you could describe it that way, yes. 

















MR. BANDUCCI: As I've said before publicly, I'm not in 
a position nor am I about to point finger at any specific 
human being or group of humans. That is part of the very 
intensive investi 
when wrong. 
we have underway to describe what 
We had very clearly written procedures. Those 
procedures were part of our SPCC. Those procedures called for 
this valve to be c It was open. 
Why that condition existed, I do not know right now. 
That is one of the paramount points that the investigation is 
looking into. 
SENATOR KEENE: I'm not asking you to point a finger at 
any specific human being, but you're not claiming that that was a 
mechanical failure at valve at the dike? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I'm not so claiming; that's right. 
SENATOR KEENE: So it was other than mechanical failure. 
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR KEENE: Is there any conclusion other than 
19 someone did something wrong, either inside of Shell or out? 
~ 0 MR. BANDUCCI: I can't quote that conclusion because I 
2l don't know that to be a fact. The valve was open. 
22 SENATOR KEENE: Well, how would it have gotten open if 
23 some person had not opened it? 
24 MR. BANDUCCI: That's the only way it could be opened. 
25 SENATOR KEENE: And how could the person be other than 
26 someone who was inside of Shell or out? 
27 
28 

























SENATOR KEENE: Okay, if it was someone outside of 
Shell, presumably you're talking about some sort of act of 
sabotage. 
82 
MR. BANDUCCI: No, I didn't say that. I'm assuming at 
this point that it was a Shell-operated facility, and I'm not 
saying that there was any outside involvement. 
SENATOR KEENE: In your judgment, did Shell fail in any 
duty to maintain a safe operation? 
MR. BANDUCCI: We did not conform to our written 
procedure and to our SPCC plan, as I have stated. That's quite 
clear. 
SENATOR KEENE: Does the fact that you did not conform, 
is that tantamount to a failure to maintain a safe operation? 
MR. BANDUCCI: You could reach that conclusion in this 
specific instance. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Excuse me, Mr. Banducci. 
Do you have counsel with you today? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, I do, sir. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Is he present? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, he is. 
SENATOR KEENE: I won't pursue that line any further 
because I don't know what procedures follow in other arenas. 
Is Shell participating in Lease Sale 91 on the north 
coast of California? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Senator, I have no knowledge of that 






















SENATOR KEENE: Does Shell plan to do any offshore oil 
drilling in California? 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Not in my lifetime. 
MR. BANDUCCI: Shell 
California. 
s offshore operations in Southern 
SENATOR KEENE: And do you know of any proposals to do 
offshore oil drilling in Northern California? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I'm not familiar with that aspect of our 
operation. 
SENATOR KEENE: If there is a human aspect in the chain 
of events, was this accident preventable? 
MR. BANDUCCI: accident was clearly preventable, in 
my view, had the operating procedure, which was clearly written 
and well-established, been followed, and had that levee valve or 
dike valve been closed. 
SENATOR KEENE: But if you have a person in the chain of 
events, that person a s not follow procedure. 
MR. BANDUCCI: That's possible. 
SENATOR KEENE: Would it have been possible to have had 
a mechanical backup that would have indicated before the event 
grew as disastrous as it has, to show you that procedure had not 
been followed by individual in charge? 
MR. BANDUCCI: No, Senator. That's precisely the type 
of question that I expect the investigating team to assess and to 
make recommendat on. 
Clearly as a result of this incident, there will be 
27 facility changes on this tank. The exact nature of them, I can't 
84 
state at this time because I don't have the full output from the 
2 
investigative team. But obviously, there will be some changes. 
SENATOR KEENE: Do you have any knowledge of where the 
internal drain system was breached? 
5 
MR. BANDUCCI: The drain system internal to the tank? 
6 
SENATOR KEENE: Yes. 
7 
MR. BANDUCCI: At this point no, sir. 
SENATOR KEENE: Thank you. 
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Senator Boatwright? 
II 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: No further questions. 
12 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What steps are you planning to take as 
a result of this spill at the facility? 
14 
MR. BANDUCCI: I can't comment on that at this time, 
15 
Senator, pending the findings and recommendations of the 
16 
investigative team that I've already alluded to. 
17 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: How long have you been with Shell? 
IX 
MR. BANDUCCI: I've been at Shell for 21 years. 
!9 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: How long at this facility? 
20 MR. BANDUCCI: I've been at this facility in my current 
21 assignment for two years. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Where were you previously? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Previously I've worked at this location 
24 for four years, from 1980-1984. I started here as an engineer in 
25 1968 after graduating from Cal. Berkeley. I was born and raised 



























I have worked in other Shell installations at Wood 
River, Illinois; at Deer Park, Texas; and I've worked in our head 
office in Houston, Texas in a multiple assignment. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So you know tanks. 
MR. BANDUCCI: I know tanks. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So tell me, what would you do to 
improve this tank? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I'm reluctant to say anything that might 
prejudice what I view to be, and what I want to be, an 
independent investigating team. If I were to say something in 
response 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I'm not asking you to in any way 
impugn or to prejudice that internal Shell investigation. 
What I'm asking is, I'm calling upon your expertise. 
You've testified to this Committee that you were educated at Cal. 
Berkeley. Obviou 's a wonderful and important school for 
the State of C i ia. 
In add ion to that, you've testified before this 
Committee that you're an engineer. In addition to that, you've 
testified before this Committee you've worked for Shell Oil for 
21 years in a number of locations throughout this country. 
I do not believe that any court in this land would not 
accept you as an expert in terms of the oil refinery business, 
given your experience and your education, and clearly given your 
credentials. 
So based upon that, putting aside this accident -- which 























would you tell us Legislators as to what kinds of improvements we 
should make in order to avoid spills like this in the future? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Senator, it would be a bit presumptuous 
of me to give you that now. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Not at all. 
MR. BANDUCCI: What I say here is that I believe the 
system was designed to prevent this spill. Clearly the spill 
. occurred. 
I believe the design was adequate, but I await the 
recommendations of this investigative team to --
CHAIRMAN TORRES: You've said that already, Mr. 
Banducci, and I'm getting a little impatient with that continued 
answer, which I'm sure at some point was thought out. 
But the fact of the matter still remains that you still 
haven't answered my question. My question is: would you think 
that an early warning system might be a good approach to apply to 
tanks across California? 
MR. BANDUCCI: If there could be designed an early 
warning system -- again, to apply to this type of tank system, 
and I remind you that the tank itself had adequate 
instrumentation on it do detect level, alarms, and so forth. 
What we're talking about here is --
CHAIRMAN TORRES: But your testimony indicated to me 
that that was not applicable in terms of leaks. 
MR. BANDUCCI: That's correct. 
























My question is, again, directed at the leak problem. 
Would you put in a Boatwright early warning system, or would you 
look at some other ternative? 
MR. BANDUCCI: There are potentially many alternatives, 
obviously. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What are they? I don't know; I'm not 
an engineer. What are some other alternatives that we ought to 
be looking at? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Again, I'm very reluctant to tell you 
this, because anything I say here today -- we obviously have 
media people present, and the people on the investigative team 
watch the news. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Banducci, this is a democracy. 
Even though I would not like to have the media everywhere I go, 
they're still there. 
(Laughter.) 
MR. BANDUCCI: I can assure you, Senator, were I to make 
statements today relative to what I think should be done, that 
that would influence what I want to continue to be an independent 
investigating team. 
In the final analysis, my opinion is one opinion. We 
have six experts on this team who have far more experience than I 
do specifically in tank design and operation. I don't have 
extensive experience in those areas. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: You know what's been my experience in 
dealing with these blue-ribbon commissions? I'd rather go to an 















the gut what he or she thinks we ought to do about the problem. 
And usually that opinion, for whatever it's worth, is always much 
more significant and right than relying on a bunch of blue-ribbon 
panel scientists/experts, lower case "e" in many cases. I'd 
rather go with the seat-of-the-pants engineer that has the 
education at Cal. Berkeley, that has 21 years experience with the 
company to tell me how to fix a tank. 
So how would you fix the tank, Banducci? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I appreciate your confidence in me and my 
ability. 
(Laughter.) 
MR. BANDUCCI: I can't answer that question, Senator, 
because for the reasons that I mentioned. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: If we had a situation that's not 
located here -- let's say you were down in Southern California, 
down in my area where you're pumping oil off my coast -- and you 
had a tank that had a leak. How would you fix it? 
MR. BANDUCCI: If I had a tank that had a leak, well 
you're asking -- that's the sam& question basically, and you 
know, I'll stand on what I said. 
I just cannot afford at this point for the reasons that 
I mentioned to make statements that would impugn the integrity of 
this investigative group. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Senator Boatwright. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: I don't think you're going to 
answer that question. 
89 
I'm going to ask you to do something and have your 
investigative team do something, and that's this: to make a 
recommendation, which I request that you forward to this 
Committee, and I would like specifically for them to address the 
5 
issue of what they would recommend could be done to detect this 
type of leak at a very early point. And perhaps maybe they could 
address their attention to the tank drain sump area; that it not 
go beyond that. And at that point or no later than that point, 
they recommend to us an early warning system that there is oil in 
10 
the tank drain sump. 
ll 
I don't think that would be violating anything if you 
12 
asked them to include in their recommendations that 
ll 
recommendation and forward that to this Committee, because I 
I~ 
think it's going to take some legislative action. I find that 
15 
quite often that's necessary. 
IG 
And if they would do that, this Committee would 
17 
appreciate that, because it's too late -- this horse is out of 
lX the barn door -- but maybe we can close the door and keep the 
19 
from happening again. 
20 That's really the intent of this Committee. It's a 
legislative committee, and our hearings under the law are to be 
held with a view toward legislation. 
So, if you're not going to answer that question, maybe 
24 we can at least get a recommendation out of your body as to what 
could be done to prevent this from happening. 
26 MR. BANDUCCI: Senator, I'd be very happy to see to it 
















SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: All right. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Let the record show that Mr. Banducci 
refused to answer the Chairman's questions regarding the safety 
and engineering of potential tank leaks at oil refineries in the 
State of California. 
Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: Why was it Shell's policy to keep the 
second valve closed, the one at the dike? 
MR. BANDUCCI: That was Shell's procedure in order to 
preclude any liquid accumulated inside the dike which might have 
any hydrocarbon on it getting outside of the dike area. That's 
the purpose of the dike, to contain anything that in or around 
that tank; contain it in that area. 
SENATOR KEENE: But if the only thing, short of a 
mechanical failure of the kind that occurred, that could have 
gone through was rain water, why should any individual who was in 
control of that valve have any real interest in seeing that the 
valve was closed? 
MR. BANDUCCI: That's a clearly defined expectation 
defined in our operating procedures, Senator. Our expectation is 
that every employee at this complex follow documented procedures. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, it was written down on paper that 
you do it this way. The employee who's in charge says, "Wait a 
minute. The only thing that's going to come through is rain 
2 ~ water. We've got a pipe system that is like you've got described 
26 there, and the only thing that's going to come through is rain 
27 water. So if I go by the book, it's got to be closed. If I 

























MR. BANDUCCI: The expectation is people do things by 
the book here, and that ly did not happen. 
SENATOR KEENE: People who feel that the book doesn't 
make any particular sense aren't going to go by the book. 
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MR. BANDUCCI: Senator, these people who operate these 
systems are trained annually in the kinds of jeopardy one can get 
involved in, including this. That's a specific provision in our 
procedures and in our SPCC plan. That training is done; it's 
documented. 
SENATOR KEENE: What I'm suggesting to you is that if 
you have someone in the chain of events who doesn't see any 
sense, short of a very improbable event occurring that the 
employee might not even have known of that would have produced 
these results, the person is going to say, "Well, I've got to go 
out and shut that valve, then I'm going to open it again, and 
open and close it. It doesn't make any sense. The only thing 
's to come through is rain water." 
I would suggest that, human nature being what it is, 
that individual is not going to place high on his or her list of 
priorities the opening and closing of that particular valve, 
despite what the book says. 
I'm not asking you to comment on that. There's no 
question mark on that, but I suggest to you very strongly that 
that's what probably occurred here, and that the failure is the 
failure of a large corporation to understand human nature and 
what motivates employees. It isn't the book. The employee has 
to have some understanding of what might occur, and this is the 
result. 
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CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Banducci, it's been alleged that 
you've indicated in previous conversations that it was a regular 
practice that the valve be left open; is that correct? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Our very early on review, Senator, 
conducted in the immediate aftermath of the incident, indicated 
that, number one, the valve was obviously open; and number two, 
7 that there may have been more than one individual who was engaged 
in that practice. 
The investigative team that I alluded to has been 
specifically asked to look into the history of practice versus 
11 procedure and to make that finding as part of its report. 
I~ CHAIRMAN TORRES: But from your own personal knowledge, 
I ' _1 was this a regular practice to leave the valve open or not? 
14 MR. BANDUCCI: I don't have that personal knowledge, 
]) sir. 
16 CHAIRMAN TORRES: So what have you told the 
17 investigative panel regarding this practice? 
!X MR. BANDUCCI: I've not talked to the investigative 
!l) panel, and that's intentional. 
20 CHAIRMAN TORRES: Do they plan to interview you? 
21 MR. BANDUCCI: That's up to them. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Have you gotten a hint or a clue that 
23 they're going to talk to you? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Sir, the integrity of that investigative 




























CHAIRMAN TORRES: I'm not asking you to influence the 
panel, Mr. Banducci, but 
plant. 
've got to hear gossip around the 
Do they to call you? 
MR. BANDUCCI: I don't know. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: If they do call you, you have no 
knowledge that this was a regular practice? 
MR. BANDUCCI: That's correct. 
93 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: The only knowledge you have, as you 
testified before this Committee, is that perhaps one other person 
before this person had also practiced that. 
MR. BANDUCCI: All I can say is that from what's been 
determined and what's obvious, that the valve was open. I cannot 
say how long it was open, whether it was a practice, or anything 
of that nature. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right. 
Madame Stenographer, would you please go back to that 
part of the testimony regarding his initial response to my 
question of whether it was a regular practice? 
(Thereupon the record was read.) 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: "There may have been more than one 
individual engaged in that practice." 
That leads me to believe that there might have been a 
regular practice of leav that valve open from your testimony? 
MR. BANDUCCI: may have been. 



















Thank you very much, Mr. Banducci, for your testimony. 
Oh wait, one more. 
Ms. Shimmin, what's the verdict on your review of the 
report that he says he gave to you that took care of the tank 
problem? 
MS. SHIMMIN: I believe he said that he had the report 
available during working hours at the facility, which I don't 
dispute. 
The date of the report is 1986. The tank came on line 
in 1984. That's still more than six months from the time the 
tank came on line to have it included in that plan. The plan 
does include the tank, and it has operating procedures that 
weren't followed, and he's just spoken to that. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So your testimony earlier that they 
had not submitted their revised report was not accurate? 
MS. SHIMMIN: My testimony was accurate. I said they 
had not submitted it to EPA. 
He alleges it was available at the plant. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What happens in these situations? I 
mean, in other words, is it the usual practice of the plants to 
make out their reports, and see if you come by? 
MS. SHIMMIN: That appears to be the intent of the 
regulation, that when we come by, we have a chance to look at the 
plan. And when such a spill as this occurs, there is an 
obligation for a report back to us on the circumstances of the 






















CHAIRMAN TORRES: The federal regulations don't require 
Mr. Banducci to send you the report every three years. You have 
to come by to look at it. 
MS. SHIMMIN: I believe that's true. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Aren't you frustrated by that? 
MS. SHIMMIN: I'm frustrated by many aspects of the way 
the law is written, yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Senator Boatwright. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Look, in your position, if you're 
frustrated, you feel it's inadequate, why don't you make a 
positive recommendation to the powers that be and that adopt your 
regulations that they change the regulations to require that 
these update reports be forwarded to the EPA? Why don't you make 
that positive recommendation? 
Maybe if nothing else comes out of this hearing, the 
hearing would have worth just for that. 
MS. SHIMMIN: It's a good recommendation. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Will you do that? 
MS. SHIMMIN: I will. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Do you have the power to do that 
through regulation? 
require 
MS. SHIMMIN: Do I have the power in my job? 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: No, does the EPA have the power to 
MS. SHIMMIN: EPA writes the regulations that --






















MS. SHIMMIN: That's true. EPA in headquarters writes 
those regulations, and EPA in the regions and other people as 
•well have an opportunity to make suggestions and to make comments 
upon regulations that are proposed and final. 
We do that routinely, and your suggestions are good. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: That also raises the suspicion that 
perhaps the reason it hasn't been done in the past is because EPA 
wanted to avoid liability. 
I'm not suggesting that you feel that way. I'm 
,suggesting that may have been the intent of the regulations, and 
;: perhaps the regulations could be improved. 
But the plan that you reviewed as of this date does 
1 include the tank and the operations? 
MS. SHIMMIN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: But that plan was not forwarded to 
you? 
MS. SHIMMIN: That's right, and the plan is dated 1986. 
The tank was in operation in 1984. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Have they completed a 1987 report? 
Your testimony indicated that these plants ought to submit a 
report every three years. 
MS. SHIMMIN: I am not aware of whether they have or 
have not. You'll have to ask them, or you can ask us in writing 






























MR. BANDUCCI: Senator, the requirement is for that plan 
to be updated every three years. It was last updated in October 
of 1986, so our next update by the normal three-year cycle would 
be in 1989. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right. 
Senator Keene. 
SENATOR KEENE: Mr. Banducci, it seems to me that if you 
ask an employee to go by the book, that the valve is supposed to 
be closed and reopened only on appropriate occasions, that either 
the employee responds positively to that direction by seeing some 
point to it, or responds out of concern of getting caught. 
Now, inasmuch as the process probably in the employee's 
mind, as it was in my mind, suggests that it's relatively 
meaningless to open and close that particular valve, because the 
only thing that could come through is rain water, then the only 
real deterrent to an employee error would be if the employee got 
caught. 
What procedures did you have in place to make sure that 
the book was being followed, that a person who did not comply 
would get caught? 
MR. BANDUCCI: Senator, first, I'll go back to what I 
said earlier. It is indeed an expectation that the procedures 
are followed. The procedures are written for very explicit 
24 purposes. 
25 Any employee who operates equipment of this type knows 
26 why the dikes are there; knows why the valves are there. We 
27 remind them of that at least annually. We don't put valves just 
















So, I cannot subscr to the thesis that the people 
involved d not under the equipment was there. 
SENATOR KEENE: But it's backwards. You don't have a 





1\ The human backup only works, human nature being what it 
I 
ilis, if the human individual understands that there's some reason 
~for doing that, or if the individual feels that they're going to 
~get caught if they don't do it. 
)/ MR. BANDUCCI: The standard position for that valve is 
I< 
ii to be closed. 
ll 
II 
11 SENATOR KEENE: That's the world as we would wish it to 
be. 
MR. BANDUCCI: that's the world as it must be by our 
procedures. 
SENATOR : That's not the world as it was on the 
day that the spi occurred. 
MR. BANDUCCI: That is correct. 
SENATOR KEENE: And it was probably not the world as it 














reasons doing you requested in the book. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Supervisor Fahden. 
II FAHDEN: As long as we're back here, I ii 
!I 
II thought Roger James had some good constructive criticism. 
I! 
I'm 
!!wondering -- he specifically that we should have inspection 


























Has ll been c at at or discussing that 
since this spill 
MR. BANDUCCI: sor, more manpower relative to 
this part ? 
SUPERVISOR FAHDEN: Well, one of the criticisms I hear 
in Martinez is the t that th that Shell does not hire 
enough employees th to more inspections. So, I was 
pleased when I ard r s perhaps there should be more 
manual inspection. And if there were, then perhaps this accident 
would never have occurred. 
As long as 're here need to hear a commitment from 
you to the people Mart z are ssing this 
problem, that you are looking to possibility of having more 
manpower. 
MR. BANDUCCI: That issue is of what 
invest t team be ng at 
At s that facili is adequate 
staffed. If 1 se, I expect '11 tell me 
that. 
SUPERVISOR FAI1DEN How many s do we have at 
Shell now? 
MR. I vJe the Martinez complex, we 
have a total of some 82 emp s. 
SUPERVISOR FAHDEN: At one t , didn't we have over 
1,000? 
MR. BANDUCCI t what time-frame 



















.the period when we were undergoing a major modernization. That 
·.was the period of 1980-1983 . We had a lot of design and 
. construction contractors, both Shell and contract people on the 
·site. And indeed, during that period of time, the total staffing 
level of the complex exceed 1,000. 
There was also a period when we hired new operating 
1
personnel to man the new facilities. 
I 
As you'll remember, we 
spent some $500 million to modernize the facility, and we created 
some new operating jobs. These people were operating new 
facilities. 
Our design -- our manning philosophy was to hire 50 
.percent more people than we believed would be necessary to man 
the facilities long-term. So, we had indeed brought in a large 
1 number of people that, from the outset, we believed would turn 
'out of the work force when we got the facility operating in a 
normal mode. 
And I believe the reference you're making to the 
thousand people was near the high point of that hiring and 
staffing in 1982-83. 
SUPERVISOR FAHDEN: And I have one other point, just to 
··refresh my memory and the Committee's. 
I believe it was in 1977, there was a leak from an oil 
23 tanker. They were filling, refueling at the Shell wharf, and the 
24 story at the time was that someone went to sleep at the pump, and 
25 I. we had this horrendous spill. 
26 At that time, it seems to me that there was State 
legislation introduced I believe it was by Senator Nejedly at 
28 
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that ta tern, a buzzer, a bell 
or something, at For if it 11 out of 
.\ 
place, or someone went there was no one around, at 
4 
it would ring. 
Is that true? I just want to n~ sh my memory on 
6 
it. I'm rather fuzzy occurred. 
7 
MR. BANDUCC s sor, I real have no knowledge of 
those incidents 977. 
9 SUPERVISOR FAHDEN: That was be you were here, but 
10 it did occur. 
ll Perhaps the ttee can be 1 into further. 
12 Roger James one more po , and that was the alarm 
14 to introduce isl 
15 Would you 
16 MR. Bl'>.NDUCC we felt would be 
17 a reliab system and this k of 
lX occurrence, I d it. 
Jl) SUPERVISOR reason I br ing these two 
2() points up, and zeroed Mr. James sa , is because I 
21 feel that been zeroing 
in on prevention, ion. 
Sure Shel more manpower, if you had 
24 an automatic alarm tern, i wou be ar less expensive than 
what you're go I it 
26 tremendously tant to so these costly, 

























I just wanted to say that, have that on the record, and 
have Shell and you all know what my feelings are in this regard. 
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you, Mr. Banducci. 
We're going to hear from Clean Bay now. Would its 
'representative come forward, please. 
SENATOR BOATWRIGHT: Would you please identify yourself, 
I sir. 
MR. MORTENSON: Good morning. 
I'm Jack Mortenson. I'm Manager of Clean Bay. 
For those of you who don't know Clean Bay, we're an 
'association of the oil companies in the area, funded for the 
purpose of being prepared to clean up oil spills, especially 
I 
those which are larger. We generally expect that our individual 
members will have the capability to accommodate the smaller 
spills. 
I think you've heard testimony from Tosco Oil this 
,morning that manifests the sort of thing we do. In this case, on 
April 1923 [sic), I received a call at about 3:23 in the evening 
-- in the afternoon, and the call came from Tosco initially, and 
shortly thereafter I got a similar call from Shell, indicating 
that there was some oil on the water in the vicinity of the 
1
: Peyton exit. 
I 
We acted by immediately calling our contractors. By 
about 4:30 that evening, we had a survey boat on the scene to 
ascertain how much oil was there, and we subsequently, about a 

























number of member f 
this. And that even 
maJor response n 
all of the sk s 




that c ean 
1 
t the next 
a 
with Shell and a 
a concern for 
the was a 
, we concluded that 
has in the general vicinity 
morning. 
confirmed that, and we 
actually set out to bri 
on the scene. 
more equ than we had first put 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: 's the total cost at this time? 
MR. MORTENSON: There are several fferent ways in 
which the money is being I can on comment on those 
which are flowing 
The last f 












was omething $1lo:i 
s of a ago. 
is to borne by Shell 
sor. 
at that time I was 
the report v-1as it wa about 5, lons, and we 
learned later 
When I went 
think that the crews 
I felt that all of 
with booms and materia 
was not 
very s 
sed what I saw. 
, very nonchalantly. 
n future ld be equipped 



























I felt that not enough emphasis was being placed on the 
:marshes. Too much emphasis was being placed on boats, et cetera. 
I have been going down almost every morning since the 
spill, and I'm watching how they're cleaning these rocks, almost 
on a just one at a time, wiping them off, mopping them up, in a 
very slow, tedious process. 
Wouldn't it be a lot better in many instances to pick up 
•that oil, this oil riprap, get rid of it, and bring in fresh 
•. rocks? 
There's also areas in the Martinez Shoreline Park where 
~the silt is visible if you're on a higher elevation. It's stuck 
in the mud about three or four feet deep. Some of those 
peninsulas and inlets are there because of siltation through the 
years. 
Wouldn't it be easier just to remove that siltation up, 
take a dredger, get it out like the Corps of Engineers is always 
doing, and taking it to somewhere else rather than to go through 
this process that, in my mind, is not really cleaning the mess 
up? 
MR. MORTENSON: Let me comment on the apparent slowness 
and almost tedious appearance of some of the efforts. 
First of all, the principle problem that we have in this 
particular spill has been a substantial amount of oil got out on 
the water before we got there, so that we have three different 
!things going on. We're attempting to remove the oil that's 
26 'moving around from the water. That has a top priority because it 
27 affects all of the shoreline. 
28 
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rned those shorelines 
which haven't yet we can to protect 
those shorelines. t s that regard become 
those of the sit area first, commercial 
s enterprises s So that was go on. 
6 
Subsequent that addit to Peyton 
7 
Slough, there had tant amount of oil that had moved 
up the shoreline back s s. So we now had 
a potential other source of 1 out. 
10 
And so, k of c are observing 
II 
there in Martinez, l are stil go ng on, were delayed early 
12 
on until we were conf the oil was moving around 
13 
wasn't simply go to area and cause us to do the 
same job over and over 
IS 
So, in mar re , we to keep 
16 
the peop 1, get 
7 
it off of the ay s c in a 
IX meaning those ted on the 
19 
To is date, we approx ly 840 barrels 
20 
of oil off Bay, and ess been able to down 
21 on the sk act t we're merely using 
that as an ad unct l 
23 CHAIRNAN TORRES 840 barrels? 
MR. MORTENSON 's our 
25 estimate, and of more barrels 




At the same time, we have a slough cleanup operation 
2 going in which we're attempting to remove oil that still will 
3 . come out each morning with the tide in the event we don't capture 
4 ~it or bottle it up. And we've been pretty much successful with 
5 
II 
1that; although, each morning, because of the fact we've had the 
6 highest tides during the dark hours, we have had some additional 
7 release from those sloughs that we've had to skim in the morning 
8 on the Bay. And that amount, I can be happy to report, has 
9 diminished considerably. 
10 And so now our concern is the final cleanup, and that 
11 will include a cleanup of the rocks and the marshlands, the mud 
12 deposits that you referred to, and all alternatives will be 
13 considered before it's over as to whether a first pass of 
14 cleaning simply to the extent that pressured water heated to a 
15 temperature can do, or whether in fact we need to replace. 
16 SUPERVISOR FAHDEN: In my judgment, I think it would be 
l7 much better to just remove. It's just going to take forever the 
18 way you're doing it. 
19 Frankly, I'm disappointed in the cleanups. 
MR. MORTENSON: Well, let me 
21 SUPERVISOR FAHDEN: I mean, I understand it's not your 
22 fault. You sent out a crew out there. But you should be out 
23 ,there first-hand to see what I see. It' just --
24 MR. MORTENSON: I can assure you, I'm out there every 
25 day, from morning to night. 
26 CHAIRMAN TORRES: Any further questions? Senator Keene, 
27 very quickly. 
28 
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MR. MORTENSON Men doc coats? 
SENATOR KEENE: Coast, coast off Mendocino. Have 
you ever been to Mendoc ? 
7 
MR. MORTENSON: Yes, have sir. 
SENATOR KEENE: Assume ally an oil platform 
9 
ten miles off the Mendoc headlands that produces a spill 
10 
roughly of this i assume a west wind, which is the usual 
II case, and a re h surf. 
12 What k of success would you had under those 
1.1 circumstances with the k 0 you have? 
14 
MR. MORTENSON: that I have is designed 
15 for operation in the 
16 We 'm not an offshore 
drilli r, many t s in the 
IS event re were o s obv Clean Bay would 
19 have to equip sel equ s lar to what is 
20 in Santa B 
2 So, I now wi Clean Bay would 
22 have to be And as in the case of the Puerto Rican 
spill, we brought equ from Santa Barbara to assist 
24 us there. 
25 SENATOR can t a disaster within 
26 waters such as is, how s prevent one along 




























I'm trying to learn something from what you've 
encountered here. 
MR. MORTENSON: The prevention has to do, I think as Mr. 
Banducci has commented on, has to do with the operation of the 
;facility. In each case, the facilities are unique. The 
shoreline facility is one thing, and an operation offshore has a 
1whole different technology involved. 
As to the cleanup equipment, we, as I say, have cleaned 
,up a considerable amount of oil from the Bay with the equipment 
.that's designed for that purpose. 
As to in the open ocean that takes a different kind of 
equipment. I have some of that at hand; I don't have all the 
'vessels necessary to make an integrated approach to that kind of 
a problem. 
SENATOR KEENE: Thank you very much for your responses. 
Any other questions of Mr. Mortenson? 
Thank you. 
MR. MORTENSON: Thank you. 
SENATOR KEENE: Brian Hunter, Regional Manager of the 
California Department of Fish and Game. 
MR. HUNTER: I'm Brian Hunter, Regional Manager of the 
Department of Fish and Game. 
Would you like to start with our activities as it 
related to this? 
SENATOR KEENE: I believe that that was the plan of the 


























MR. HUNTER: ce, loc Youn lle, 
was notified Sacramento 
Saturday afternoon 
We had a 
with the people 
rden 
were 
make recommendations on 
area come over here and work 
l oil, and start to 
act it s should be. 
They also fied the rest of us Department in 
the area so that we 
That Warden s 
The following 





have copies of 
SENATOR 
j 
an abalone that's too 
know. I've prosecuted a 
also 
, we had s 
the evening on Saturday. 




ronment from further damage, 
and ll Oil on how to go 
the marshes that we were 
on cr 1 law, 5650, and I 
Committee. 
you if someone cks 
on them I 
cases. And if somebody 
shoots a out o season, you come hard. 
tantially greater Here's s 0 
magnitude. do you it? 
MR. HUNTER: vle I we on two s of laws: a 
criminal law and a aw s sections in our 
Fish and Game are s s ion. 
The cr nal least stiff. It's a 


























However, the civil laws, the Fish and Game Code Sections 
2014, 12015, 12016, 12017, provide for us to order cleanup if 
·it's necessary for us to do so, and charge it to a cleanup 
account, and then to go after the oil company or the polluter 
,civilly to reclaim any expenses for the cleanup and any expenses 
'for damages to the environment. 
SENATOR KEENE: How do you measure damage to the 
, environment? If birds are killed, for example, or if aquatic 
life is injured or killed, how do you come to dollar amounts? 
MR. HUNTER: First of all, we go through a complete 
,'damage assessment. That damage assessment team involves more 
than Fish and Game, but Fish and Game is a principle part of it, 
"but also the Water Quality Control Board, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, and other environmental agencies. 
What we have done in this particular case, our first few 
days were involved in damage -- not damage assessment, but 
preventing further damage and making recommendations on how to go 
about the cleanup without causing any additional damage. 
By Tuesday, we started our damage assessment activities. 
And they are continuing now and will continue for some time. 
We took some steps to bring in specialized biologists to 
look at certain types of rare and endangered vegetation that 
could be damaged. We brought in a biologist to look for rare and 
~endangered animals: one specific for the birds out there in the 
25 marsh, and one specific for the famous salt marsh harvest mouse. 
26 They make notes and records, so what we try and do is, 
27 make an estimate of how many animals were directly affected; make 
28 
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some est s of effects were, and in this 
2 
particular case, f ts could through the food 
3 
chain. The marsh serves s the is to convert vegetative to 
animal matter process, we think that that, 
5 
perhaps, is the damage. So, our biologists have been working on 
6 trying to make some assessment 
7 
We do not think has been any direct impact on 
free-swimming fishes, there may have been. And we will do 
some follow-up studies, pass th Shell, asking them to do 
10 some through a con tant to make a nation on that. 
II SENATOR KEENE: How do you convert that into dollars, if 
12 you lose a portion of the ? 
13 MR. HUNTER: We b ical data we get, and we 
14 work with economists k of formulas to try 
15 to come up with an An economic value for any 
16 ind an 1 i to are a variety of 
17 factors, such as to hunt it, for fish for 
IX it, or go at t, to the existence of that 
19 particular animal. 
20 In the one o 1 spil , seagoing bird the 
21 murre, we es 1 i be about $240 per bird would 
22 a reasonable That was then used in the 
3 civil litigation. L 
24 SENATOR KEENE: st of Mr. Hunter? 
25 Thank you very testimony. 
26 We'll the s a , and we'll continue 






















(Thereupon the Court Reporter took 
a brief break, and the following is 
transcribed directly from audio tape 
recordings.) 
SENATOR KEENE: Jimm Edgar, President of the Mount 
'Diablo Chapter of the National Audubon Society. 
MR. EDGAR: Yes, Jimm Edgar, President, Mount Diablo 
,Audubon Society. 
Thank you for the opportunity to share some thoughts 
!with you this morning and this afternoon, now. 
112 
This society in particular has -- it's a very emotional 
: experience for me to drive over again this morning and look at 
this marsh, because this chapter of the society has been involved 
for the last five or six years in attempting to preserve this, 
which we believe and others, that is the most significant piece 
,of wetland habitat in the County of Contra Costa. And to see 
that lost in the matter of a few hours is a great, great tragedy. 
And of course, fitting into the fact that probably over 
· 90 percent of the wetlands, over 90 percent of the wetlands, in 
•• the San Francisco Bay estuary have been lost. We are looking at 
the remaining few wetlands that we believe are absolutely 
'critical. 
On Monday of this week, the Mt. Diablo Chapter, along 
24 ·with some other organizations, called a press conference. And 
25 I'm not going to go through that, but I would like to submit it 
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levy a use-tax against companies that use the resources of a 
I 
particular out of county, here, to distribute throughout the 
Western United States, because these resources are putting --
being put in jeopardy and stress on an ongoing basis, and this is 
,great evidence of that. 
We would like to see that take place. We could work --
' Shell Oil could continue to work with the Board of Supervisors 
.and other agencies, say, in Martinez, East Bay Regional Park, to 
,• preserve this land, to maintain, preserve for the ongoing 
. restoration of wetlands, which the National Audubon Society, for 
the last four years, has established as its number one 
,environmental priority. And we are utterly committed to that. 
Thank you. 
SENATOR KEENE: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Alice Berkner, International Bird 
Rescue Research Center. 
(Thereupon the Court Reporter 
returned to the hearing, and the 
following is transcribed from her 
stenographic notes.) 
MS. BERKNER: I'm Alice Berkner with the Bird Rescue 
22 Research Center in Berkeley, California. We were incorporated 
23 back in 1971, during the San Francisco Bay oil spill, when 
24 approximately 20,000 birds were affected. Of those birds, 7,000 
25 were collected for treatment, and 3 percent were released after 




s t , we' able to e the time in 
captivity c techn s for 
those birds. we re not sc s or things that bite, 
4 
we're active in sulti contingency planning, 
5 
we've done -- re to many oil spills around the United 
6 
sessions in most 
7 coastal States -- Ala a, Hawaii for government and 
industry. 
We were notified of spill at approximately 6:45 in 
10 
the evening by both 11 I bel it was Capta Broderick 
I I from the Department of Fish and Game first, and shortly 
12 thereafter by Shell. 
I guess we've rece n excess of 400 an s. I s 
l4 "animals" because 're not al bi We received some 
l5 oiled turtles, some Two firsts for bird rescues: six 
16 oiled crawdads and a toad been released. 
17 Most of s now are for re se. The vast 
!X majori are goi to ld, f domestic as opposed 
19 to the wi species And a b difference here, because 
20 many of these rds are tes. are not a native 
2! s. re s a deal of concern as to whether or 
not the birds are go to be back in the area. I 
they are. I would to make some at ions for their 
care once they are rel 
25 I realize area been teres ted 
26 in these birds for a long 1 1 t I add that I 
27 recognized two of the geese s lls. But I would 


























CHAIRMAN TORRES: How did you know they were the 
previous geese? 
116 
MS. BERKNER: They had specific kind of wing injury to 
the primary feathers. The large wing feathers kind of stuck out, 
so yes, I remember them. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: They've been pretty tough old birds to 
have withstood two spills now? 
MS. BERKNER: You'd be amazed at what birds can survive. 
It was unfortunate that many of the domestic birds out 
here are not fed properly. And their condition before they were 
oiled was not the best. So hopefully, we're going to straighten 
''that out by advising people to give them grain foods rather than 
white bread and Twinkies. It's not something that birds normally 
'eat in the wild. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: White bread and what? 
MS. BERKNER: Well, Twinkies. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Oh, Twinkies. 
MS. BERKNER: Cheerios, what have you. The kind of 
thing that one often feeds to domestic birds. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: To our children, right? 
(Laughter.) 
MS. BERKNER: I should hope not. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: That's what we should give our 
children, grains instead of Twinkies. 
All right, thank you very much. 
Any questions? 






















Zeke Grader, Pacif Coast ion of Fishermen's 
Associat forward. 
MR. GRADER Thank you Senator Torres, Senator Keene, 
Senator Boatwr t, for this i here to speak this 
morning regarding some of our concerns on the 23rd of April oil 
spill that happened at the 11 refi 
We do have ser concerns regarding the impacts of 
this spill that occurred the ecological important zone 
of entrapment that's so critical for our striped bass and 
migrating salmon. 
the "zone of entrapment," if I can explain, this is 
the area in San Francisco where have the fresh water 
outflows from the Sacramento and San Joa systems corning into 
the Bay, meeting with 
from the Bay. it 
tween 
nutrients. As a re 
creates a very eco ical 
That's extreme 
salmon that are on 
estuary. 're 
sea. It's also 
bass. 
In a sense, this 
time and a worse ace. 
t 1 f salt water corning in 
s is, i creates a mixing area thin 
salt and sh water -- that tends to 
t of s trap of nutrients, it 
area. A of feed in that. 
ion to 
1 cou 
, particularly for juvenile 
sea. 're in the 
over to salt water to go to 
the juvenile striped 
not come at a worse 
months, of course 
26 right now, April June, we're looking at the 






















And to give you some importance or some idea of the importance of 
. these stocks, is that the Sacramento/San Joaquin system, as 
degraded as it is, and looking at only approximately 40 percent 
.·of the remaining historical runs from that system are at that 40 
percent level, it nevertheless does provide for somewhere between 
50-80 percent of the salmon harvested offshore California 
originate in this system. And this is extremely important, 
'therefore, to the coastal economies of both Central and Northern 
California. 
This year, however, these outgoing smelts are extremely 
'vulnerable because we're looking at lowered outflow because of 
1 the dry conditions. Really what these fish need on their 
out-migration during the spring is between 16,000 and 18,000 cfs, 
~cubic feet per second. This year, of course, we're below that. 
Furthermore, these fish were also impacted this last 
'fall as a result -- although we had record spawning escapement; 
that is, a record number of fish returning to the rivers to 
spawn; many of these fish were lost primarily due to the 
operations of the Bureau of Reclamation where it essentially 
burned these fish by releasing hot water from both the Shasta and 
21 Folsom Dams. That meant that, although we had record escapement, 
22 a record number of fish back to the rivers, we lost much of the 
23 spawning escapement. So therefore, the record runs that we 
24 expected, the record number of smelts coming downstream we did 
25 not see. And now they're impacted by the loss of flows, and now 




I th also, jus an of the importance 
of this zone whe , I like to 
3 
present to s, or two s 
4 
were done. st was sented to Bay Delta hearings 
this past In it was the on imary piece of 
6 
research introduced ng. It was prepared 
7 
by the Bay Institute on of Suisun Bay. 
And also an earl of on which most of this 
9 




If I can t to , Senator, now. 
!2 CHAIR.rv'.tAN TORRES you much, sir. 
13 
Any st s of . Grader? 
14 
MR. GRADER: I d j e to add, if I can, there are a 
15 
couple of i I want to , is I we do share 
16 
Senator Keene's Coast 
17 at is 
IX it's one c up even 
19 buy a marsh. But I th far , as we've 
20 found out in Wes l s from oil i 1 there 
/1 _, over two decades st 1 ser e fects I we 
22 to 
have be assured we are 
24 going to sses. I 't think 
25 the fishermen for California 
26 Department of Fish and Game the Pacif Council once 



























fishing catches because, gee, there was this Shell Oil spill of 
three years ago." We're not going to tolerate that. 
We expect the California Department of Fish and Game, if 
~they can sue the Mountain Lion Coalition for disagreeing with 
them, by God, they can sue Shell Oil to get full mitigation for 
the losses of this public resource and the losses it's going to 
,create for the commercial fishermen. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you very much. 
SENATOR KEENE: Just a quick --
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Very quickly, Senator. 
SENATOR KEENE: I notice Mr. Grader's taken his seat 
already, but in terms of the risk of a spill, it seems to me that 
the magnitude of that occurring out on the ocean -- with changing 
'tides, and given the size of the equipment being used, and the 
'fact that it's in motion, and the fact that you've got geological 
formations some of which are unstable -- the magnitude of the 
risk is intensified many times. And the ability to clean up is 
,reduced many, many times because of the same reasons: the 
enormous tides, and the winds, and the potential for damage is so 
much greater over there. 
So we ought to learn by this. We ought to prevent this 
from happening in the Bay, further tragedy. But we also ought 
~not increase the risk to California by opening up the North 
1coast, the very rugged North Coast, to offshore oil drilling. 
That's my statement, Mr. Chairman. 
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CHAIHMAN TORRES: I just add, I know sometimes 
Northern Cali i s don• Los Angeles, but I just 
.1 
want to let you 1 , I'm very, very that as an 
supportive of rn Cali 's environmental issues, even 
sometimes to the disda of my friends in Southern California, 
6 
simply because I 1 t want to see happen to the North Coast that 
7 
which has already I Southern California Coast. to 
think people i ia ought to take more time to 
9 
visit the incred of is Northern California area, 
j() 
really from Santa Cruz all way 
II 
I just want to the fishermen and others to know that 
12 
this is one Los Ange s Senator that will consistently for the 
interests of Northern California it comes to 
1-+ 
environment. 
SENATOR KEENE tal , I l your --
16 





SENATOR KEENE: recall ve v your trip to 
20 
inspect the results of the devastat ng f on the Russian 
21 
River not too rna years when e and furniture were 
!! being evacuated home were being saved and in the midst of all 
that, you into the area. I remember 
very, very well. We're ve 
25 CHAIRMAN , Senator. 




























She's been waiting anxiously all morning. Welcome, 
·Madame Mayor. 
MAYOR O'ROURKE: Thank you, Senator. Thank you for 
,! bringing your Committee here. 
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I'm hoping that your attention to this issue will have a 
1 profound effect, as it did on our struggle with I.T. in the City 
··of Benicia. 
I have about six issues which I'd like to draw to your 
attention, which I think will add to your investigation of this 
incident and ways to prevent it happening again, and ways to 
remedy what has already occurred. 
First of all, one of the issues that has not come up 
today is the fact that the City of Benicia, north Solano County, 
was not notified of this spill at any point officially. We found 
out -- we find out today that the spill occurred, or was first 
realized that it occurred, on Saturday afternoon. Our officials 
were notified at 8:30 Sunday morning by a tugboat operator that 
there was some oil in the Strait and did anybody know about it. 
So at that point, our Fire Department and our Parks and 
Rec. Department, and everyone else, began to swing into action to 
see what we could do about it. We were the ones who notified 
Solano County. 
So, I think, first of all, there's a serious problem in 
effective emergency response planning which might, in fact, get 
back to the contingency planning that EPA has apparently approved 
























Also, I'm not, edgeable about what kind 
of response is k f we were 
dismayed, and I ss , by fact there seemed to 
be so few peop out re Clean Bay people. I don't 
know what their lity is, when you look at the profits 
of the oil compan s, such a severe spill as this, it is 
interesting to me was not a more rapid deployment of 
people and of services. 
Also what has come to our attention is that the agencies 
in the area don't have d 't know how to respond to this. 
This was a new rience to many of So t when I flew 
over the site, I think it was three or rwards, 
there was this terrib concern still as to what le should 
do. No one seemed to have 
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to control the 11 
of comments that you made 
to new legislation, I 
would say 
would en 
we need, certa s which 
mon 
that there are more than a 
know that you have no j 
within the State are 
n some sh It's understanding 
sand tanks in this area. And I 
over EPA, but I do that 
to 1 EPA 
25 constantly demonstrate . 
26 I share frustration th EPA struggles that 























Corporation; in fact, that Martinez and this County has had. We 
have received precious little help from EPA, and we have come to 
the point where we expect nothing from them, and so we're never 
disappointed. 
But I would say that what we have to do on the State 
level is try to supplement that so that we can take care of 
ourselves. Whether it's Reagan's fault, or EPA's fault, or this 
lady who's here, or whomever, I'm at the point where I just can't 
bother with that. 
supplement this. 
I think that perhaps the State can help 
I also know that Exxon, which Senator Boatwright 
referred to as Hummel Oil, which is now Exxon Corporation, has a 
different way of releasing their liquid or their water into the 
Strait. There is a fish kill experiment that goes on continually 
before anything is released into the Bay. 
So, I would ask that there's differential regulations 
for whether the oil companies that stretch along the Strait 
employ different ways before they release their liquids into the 
Strait. 
I also -- obviously, a question comes up that if this 
dike was open, no one has received the answers as to how long it 
was open; whether it was open for three days, four months, three 
years, or whatever. When was that last checked? And if it has 
not been checked on a regular basis, what else has seeped out 























It seems also that was no method accounting 
for that tank i it was a was con inual 
filled, which is astoni to me, that Shell could not tell you 
instantly how much had gone that tank. That there's no 
sort of meter that was on with today's high technology. 
Also, I you and others up here surmise that 
EPA has some sort of ized stem upon which they place 
every piece of information they have. I would seriously doubt if 
that's true. I would like to be told that it is, and that it's 
regularly updated and utilized, but I haven't seen any evidence 
of it in my associat EPA. 
I think also f l suggestion I would make to 
you -- I don't know 
be employed -- th I. T. , were final fined over $3 
million, which we saw none of. all goes to the State 
Treasury, which I l covet and l to 
different ways, a Governor dif s, 
we don't see of it. So all of the troub and the damage 
that the environment, we ing. 
In this s I I t instead of fines 
that would go into the State T those mon s -- I would 
agree with s -- monies should be directed 
toward not restorat and 1 that way; that should just done 
as part of their But mon s come in should be 
used to improve the recla areas of the marsh that 
ought to be rec , and some sort of a trust 
fund that would make sure there is money there to continue 
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to take care of the problems, which I have a feeling will stretch 
on for many, many years. 
Benicia has responded. I think that I ought to tell 
you, Benicia always seems to come through. We have helped to 
rescue birds, and our Fire Chief calls the people from the Bird 
Rescue people "saints". 
7 
I think that as we are criticizing people, we certainly 
X 
should acknowledge that the Regional Board has come through with 
() 
flying colors in this instance, as have all of the people who 
10 
have -- from the Coast Guard and certainly the Bird Rescue 
II 
people. So, I think it's important to acknowledge them as well. 
12 
I again would like to thank you for directing your 
attention to this. 
14 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you very much. 
15 








CHAIRMAN TOF.RES: Yes, I thought so. 
2() COUNCILMEMBER FULTON: I'd like to thank you, as did 
21 Mayor O'Rourke in her reference, for helping us rein in I.T. 
22 Corporation and the efforts of your staff. Very helpful. And I 
thank you for coming down here today. 
I'm here to tell you that the citizens of Benicia feel 
25 frustrated, angry, and helpless. We miss our wildlife; don't 
like the goo and Shell Oil Company refinery stench that still 



























L you and speakers today, we wonder why 
this nightmare ever n a way in this , I was 
glancing th the report that Regional Board submitted. 
On Page 8, scribe why s roof drain was constructed in 
the way it was. Apparently only two tanks share this common 
design. And they say s ly that Shell chose not to 
install a pump with a large capacity to handle the 
stormwater runoff from these two tank roofs that other tanks have 
that take it to the waste water system because of the cost. So 
it's just a money issue that we end up with this kind of 
environmental disaster. 
I also wonder why we have 
past several weeks when you look 
problem we have in the 
to 1986, the spill that 
Shell had on their r was 8,000 gallons spilled, a 
major spill, and it rel to a storage I would think 
that would caused them to move away the n watchman 
kind of tion rout and into of high techno 
device. 
so 
there could be some 
I'd like to 
out there wait 
thousand-plus 
to 
and Richmond, and W 
million gallons of 






there are other disasters 
Mayor mentioned, there are a 
shoreline between here 
land Oil has a facility that has over 2 
s And there are rail 
Strait daily, c ing all kinds of toxics. 
The "aw shucks, we re " approach isn't acceptable 
corporate responsibility. to the citizens of Ben We 























type of criminal sanctions. I think if Mr. Banducci would have 
been faced with staying a couple days in the County Jail across 
the street if we had this kind of oil spill, there's a high 
likelihood that the oil spill wouldn't have occurred. 
So I'd ask you please, as you leave the hearing today, 
to consider legislative proposals, State proposals, to enact some 
type of criminal sanctions when you have environmental disasters 
of this magnitude. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: All right. 
COUNCILMEMBER FULTON: Finally, as to the cleanup 
process, we've been promised by Shell Oil that they'll do what is 
reasonable for the cleanup. 
To me, that's a weasel answer. I asked them at a 
Council meeting Tuesday night, "How clean is clean?" They didn't 
really answer that. They stated that they'll make us whole, but 
from the research I've done, and what I've heard today, we really 
can't be made whole. This has destroyed a generation of 
wildlife; the marshes have been affected. They'll be affected 
for years when the oil gets 
terrible disaster. 
the food chain. And it's just a 
Since we can't be made whole, I would concur with the 
recommendations of other speakers that some type of special 
mitigation fund be investigated, and hopefully State legislation 
proposals enacted that would allow communities to be subsidized 
with dollars so they can go out and carry out their own 
mitigation measures and have impact fees to improve marshes, and 


















Finally, I think Mr. Schober is going to speak to the 
problem of detection. In Ben ia, we didn't learn about this 
spill until 18-19 hours after the Shell Oil Company knew of the 
spill. I think we could have done a lot to mitigate the impacts 
on our side. There seems to be a need for better coordination 
here. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you very much. 
COUNCILMEMBER FULTON: Thank you. 
SENATOR KEENE: Question, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Yes, Senator. 
SENATOR KEENE: You indicated in your testimony that 
this was one of only two tanks that did not go through the waste 
water treatment facility, but went into an embankment area where 
the valve was supposed to be closed. 
Is it your impression that had these tanks been treated 
as the other tanks, is would not have occurred? 
COUNCILMEMBER FULTON: Yeah, I don't th we would 
JX been plagued with the type of design flaws that these two tanks 
!9 
20 
had, and the problem wou not have existed. 
SENATOR KEENE: I wish I could have asked Mr. Banducci 
:21 that question. 
22 COUNCILMEMBER FULTON: I wish he were still here so we 
23 could ask him the question. 





COUNCILMEMBER FULTON: Thank you. 










Our last witness is going to be Mr. Frank Shober, who is 
Assistant Director of Solano County Office of Emergency Services. 
If you had wanted to testify and we do not allow that 
time for your testimony, please be assured that if you'll send us 
a written statement -- handwritten is fine, or typed if you 
prefer we will include your remarks as part of the official 
record as had you testified before the Committee. 
Thank you for your patience and understanding. 
Welcome, Mr. Schober. 
MR. SCHOBER: Senator Torres, Senators, I'm the 
Assistant Director of Emergency Service for Solano County. 
I think you'll be delighted to hear that my testimony 
will be exceedingly short because I wish to backup the testimony 
of the Mayor of Benicia and Councilman Fulton. 
But the warning should be explained a little more. We 
were not warned and told the system broke down. Part of your 
17 investigation, continuing investigation, might discover what 
IX needs to be repaired in this area. 
10 But you also should know, talking to my colleagues in 
211 Contra Costa County, their Emergency Services was not warned. 
21 And their response team learned of the spill, or the imminent 
~~ spill, from Tosco Oil Company and not from any official channels. 
2l I would back up the suggestion of the Mayor of Benicia 
24 that we have a regional plan that works. Federal officials here 
25 today referred to a regional plan. We don't know about it in 
2h Solano or Contra Costa Counties, I venture. So we need one, and 
27 I think it should be backed up with some resources that allow us 























A warning would helped our boat owners and our 
mar as. We d 't warning. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thank you . 
We're going to conclude now with some recommendations. 
It's a policy of this Committee, whenever we do have a 
fact finding hearing, that we make some preliminary findings. 
Number one, it's clear that a disastrous ecological 
event has occurred as a result of failing to follow federal 
regulation that requires bypass valves to be sealed and opened 
only upon a visual inspection. 
Secondly, the SPCC plan was not submitted to EPA for 
review, and the EPA does not currently have enough staff or 
agency methods in place to adequately monitor oil storage tanks. 
One of my preliminary recommendations will be, number 
one, we require that updates of the SPCC plans been submitted to 
EPA for review. It's our understanding EPA will make that 
recommendation to their regulators. 
Secondly, that we require the placement of early warning 
systems, or as I call it, the "Boatwright-Keene early warning 
system," for draining from any source from the oil storage areas. 
This would cover the stormwater runoff, periodic cleaning of the 
tanks, or other discharges that could flow into State or federal 
waters or wildli areas. 
24 Thirdly, that we require that any discharges into State 





















Fourthly, that we recommend to the Attorney General that 
he vigorously prosecute wrong doings 
of State policy. 
this matter as a matter 
And fifthly, that we require the drainage from tanks be 
from berm areas only after a person has manually opened a valve 
so that no automatic valves should be used. 
Sixth, that we require the Regional Water Quality Board 
to investigate the adequacy of current fines and other 
enforcement measures that can be taken to avoid these spills. I 
believe that creating incentives not to do certain acts is 
extremely important, and whether we need to increase the fines is 
something that I certainly would support. 
And lastly, that we require notification to all cities 
and counties within the affected geographic area so that they 
might be better able to respond to the situation. 
Those are our preliminary findings and preliminary 
recommendations. Of course, they may be expanded as we finish up 
our work in the matter of review of the testimony so ably and 
carefully recorded by our fine Reporter. 
Thank you very much. This hearing is in adjournment. 
(Thereupon this hearing of the 
Senate Committee on Toxics and Public 
Safety Management was adjourned at 






























CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER 
I, EVELYN MIZAK, a Shorthand Reporter of the State of 
California, do hereby certify: 
That I am a disinterested person herein; that the 
foregoing Senate Toxics and Public Safety Management Committee 
•• hearing on the subject of Martinez/Shell Oil Spill, held on 
Friday, May 6, 1988, at the Martinez City Council Chambers in 
Martinez, California, was reported verbatim in shorthand by me, 
Evelyn Mizak, and thereafter transcribed into typewriting. 
I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney 
for any of the parties to said hearing, nor in any way interested 
in the outcome of said hearing. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 
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This background paper describes the recent oil spill that 
occurred in Martinez, Californ ; identifies various provisions 
of federal and state law governing oil storage tanks and spills 
therefrom; and presents issues and questions that relate to the 
spill. 
BACKGROUND 
On Fr , May 6, 1988, the Senate Toxics and Public Safety 
Management will hold an informational hearing on the 
oil ll that occurred on April 23, 1988, from a Shell Oil 
Company tank in Martinez, California. The spill involves 175, 
to 250,000 gallons of crude oil that drained into Peyton S 
and then the Carquinez Strait. 
According to the Shell Oil Company, the cause of the spill 
was apparently a leak which allowed crude oil to enter the roo 
drain piping (Attachment A is the manufacturers' drawing of 
piping) . The valves at the tank and for the levee had been le 
open to allow rain falling on the roof of the tank to drain to 
the stormwater outfall. Shell reports that the actual cause o 
the oil entering the roof drain system is not likely to be 
determined until the tank can be removed from service and 
ted. 
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The State Water Resources Control Board (state board) and the 
nine regional water quality control boards (regional boards) are 
responsible for regulating and protecting the water quality of 
California. The state board is responsible for developing an 
effective plan for water quality control and for administering 
grants to local governments to construct waste water treatment 
facilities. The state board also issues permits and licenses to 
facilities that use water from streams, rivers, and lakes. The 
nine regional boards, located throughout the state, including San 
Francisco Bay Region, are responsible for developing and 
enforcing standards for water quality control within their 
respective regions. 
To protect the State's waters, the Porter-Cologne Water 
Quality Control Act, requires the State to regulate any 
activities that may affect the quality of the State's waters, 
both surface waters and groundwater. The State Water Code 
generally provides for civil penalties, injunctive relief and 
criminal penalties for unauthorized releases to the waters of the 
State (Water Code §13300 et. seq.) The Porter-Cologne Act also 
authorizes the state board to exercise those powers delegated to 
the State by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (also known 
as the Clean Water Act). Through this federal law, the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency has authorized the State 
to issue permits regulating discharges into the State's navigable 
waters, including oceans, bays, and rivers. 
National Oil and Hazardous Material Pollution Contingency Planning 
The Federal Water Pol Control Act includes a provision for 
, federal, state, and local oil oil 
1, and regional plans are to 







Def it of the authorities, responsibilities, and 
duties of the various agencies. 
Notification procedures. 
Identification of response capacity which will be 
committed in the event of an oil spill. 
Speci and well defined procedures to facilitate 
recovery of damages and enforcement measures as under 
state and local statutes. 
Martinez-






























Martinez-Shell Oil Spill 
May 6, 1988 
Page 5 
1. Is the current federal and state regulatory system adequate 
for large scale oil facilities? 
2. Is their adequate coordination between federal and state 
agencies to insure adequate conformance of existing safety 
and operations standards? 
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3. Is additional independent state authority for inspection and 
surveillance of above ground hazardous materials storage 
facilities needed? 
4. The oil from the tank spill entered a drainage ditch and 
flowed downstream through Peyton Slough and into the 
Carquinez Strait. 
Why did 176,000 gallons of oil spill into the Shell Marsh and 
the Carquinez Strait instead of a backup containment or 
treatment system? 
5. The use of floating roofs in oil storage tanks appears to be 
widespread. 
How common in the industry are the flexible-steel drain pipes 
for stormwater draining? 
6. In floating-roof tanks as found at the Martinez-Shell Oil 
facility, there is a flexible-steel drain pipe for draining 
stormwater. This pipe is sent through the middle part of 
those tanks. If this pipe breaks, oil will be sent to the 
same place as the stormwater. 
How many other storage tanks throughout the state are 

















I. The Event 
A. What happened? 
B. How did the company respond? 
c. Why did it happen? 
D. How extensive are the damages? 
II. Government's Response to the Event 
III. 
IV. 
A. What did each agency do? 
B. Was there coordination among agencies? 
C. How quickly did public agencies respond? 
D. How effective was the government agencies response? 
Current environmental safety policies governing large 
oil tanks 
A. What are the pertinent government policies 
(statutes and regulations) governing the review 
of large oil tanks? 
B. Were the government policies followed by Shell Oil 
in this oil spill? 
What done? 
A. In s instance, what remains to be done to 
alleviate the damages to the environment? 
B. What needs to be done to avoid similar spills 
in the future, both here and any similar oil tanks 
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May 6, 1988 
Remarks by Vice Mayor Bill Pollacek 
On behalf of the residents and city council of Martinez I 
would like to thank the State Senate Toxics Committee for holding 
its hearing today in Martinez. I would especially like to thank 
committee chairman Art Torres for bringing the committee down to 
Martinez for the hearing. 
The circumstances which bring the committee here are 
extremely unfortunate. As you can see many of us are quite 
concerned about the impact of the oil spill on our environment 
and our water. The spill at the Shell Oil refinery complex is 
the worst environmental disaster of recent memory in the 
Carquinez Straits and Suisun Bay area. The total extent of the 
damage to the SBc~amento river's ecosystem is still unknown. 
I think I can speak for most people when I say that I hope 
the damage done t, the river, the wildlife and the neighboring 
wetlands is not p .. manent and can be healed. 
I h o p e t he c ' m 1:li t t e e w i 11 no t on 1 y d e t e r m i n e t he ex t e n t o f 
the damage to the .nvironment, but also the de3~~e o[ negligence 
by Shell Oil and ~t further steps Shell should take to clean up 
the damHge cause~ y the its oil spill. 
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Pollacek Remarks page 
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SENATE TOXICS AND PUBLIC SAFETY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
HEARING ON MARTINEZ/SHELL OIL SPILL 
MAY 6, 1988 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 
14S 
1. A disastrous ecological event occurred as a result of failing 
to follow a federal regulation that requires the bypass valve 
to be sealed and opened only upon a visual inspection. 
2. The SPCC Plan (Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure 
Plan) was not submitted to EPA for review. 
3. The EPA does not currently have enough staff or agency 
methods in place (computers) to adequately monitor oil 
storage tanks. 
PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Require that updates of the SPCC Plans be submitted to EPA 
for review. 
2. Require placement of an early warning system for drainage 
from~ source from the oil storage areas. This would cover 
stormwater runo f, periodic cleaning of the tanks, or other 
discharges that can flow into state or federal waters or 
wildlife areas. 
3. Require that any discharges into state or federal waters be 
tested for s le chemical content prior to transmission. 
Maybe the same way people test swimming pools for the 
chemical content. 
4. Recommend to Attorney General Van de Kamp that he vigorously 
prosecute wrongdoings in s matter. 
5. Require that drainage from tanks be from berm areas only 
after a person has manually opened a valve. No automatic 
valves shou be used. 
6. Require the Regional Water Quality Board to investigate the 
adequacy of current fines and other enforcement measures that 
can be to avoid those spills. Greater monitoring can 
be one method. 
7. Require notif ation of oil spills to all cities and counties 
within the affected geographic area. 
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BEFORE 
RESFOOSE OF '!HE 
SAN FRANCISOO ~ REGicttAL QJALITY' a:HmOL B:lARD 
'ro OIL SPILL AT 
SHELL OIL OOMPANY, MARriNEZ MANtJFACIURlNG COMPLEX 
Introduction 
Oil was d:Jserved in the carquinez strait on .April 23, 1988 near the Shell 
Oil CC:mpany's petroleum refine:ty in Martinez, the Martinez Manufacturin:J 
Col.'rplex (MMC). It was originally sited near Shell's wharf (see Attachment 
A- location map) at ~tely 1415 hours. '!he oil was traced upstream 
to Peyton Slough arrl the upstream drainage cn:J.rSe trib.rtary to Peyton 
Slough. '!he drainage oc:.urse receives st.orm,.m.ter runoff :fran a very small 
portion of Shell's refine:ty ani the treated wastewater discharge fran 
Mamtain View sanitary District. 
Upon investigation, it was discovered approximately 1500 hours, that 
crude oil was leakin;J :fran a st.oraqe tank on Shell's refinery property 
through an 
Peyton Slough. It has been estimated by 1 that approximately 4272 
barrels or ~tely 180,000 galloos of crude oil was spilled. 
'!he pxrpose of this report is to provide a summa:cy of the Regional Board's 
authority, response, arrl potential enforcement action related to this spill 
event. 
Presented at the May 6, 1988 Hearin:J of the Senate Ccm:nittee on Toxics ar.d 










by the :tedlerl:!ll 
the aut.llOrl 





-were adopted by the Boani on 
85-22 and amen:ied by the Boani on 
February 18, 1987 in :l3oal:d order No. 87-10, and on AugUst 19, 1987 in Board 
order No. 87-100. !base orders also serve as a Federal NPDES Permit, No. 
C'A0005789, because the state of califomi.a is delegated the authority from 
EPA to issue such . ....-·-
'!he :l3oal:d requires Shell to meet specific discharge limits for pollutants 
present in their prior to d.i.scllal:ge throogh a deepwater 
diffuser to carqui.nez Additionally, the Board requires Shell to 
meet discha:rge limits for ~ter :t'llnJff fran all areas within the 
refinery. 
'!he Board also requires Shell to subnit within 90 days after adoption of 
their order, a technical report on preventive (failsafe) and contirgency 
(cleanup) plans for oontrollin;J accidental disdla:rges, and for minimizin:J 
the effect of such events (see Attachl:lent c, page 6 of S't:arDard 
Provisions of Shell's should identify the 
~ .......... ., .... ""' sources 
facilities 
and evaluate the effectiveness of 
prevent and control spills. 'Ihe 
Board does nJt include as cc:n::litions of the permit the 
facilities or procedures ootli.ned in the plan. 'Ihe report is required by 
the NPDES permit u:rrler the authority of 40 CFR 122, and is separate from 
the ca..mt.ermeasur (SPCC) Plans required by 
EPA urrler the authority of 40 CFR 112. 
Shell Company 
required by 
a technical report to the Regional Boani as 
:N'RJES .., ........ ~ ........ addresses their preventive practices arrl 
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Shell contract:Ed with an spill cleanup~, Clean Bay, to initiate 
clean up and cantainme.nt of A bean was deployed at the 
u::uth of Peyton a vacuum truck was brou:Jht on the scene to 
remove oil fran the Slough at the tide Initial damage to Peyton 
Slough and the was noted to be extensive. 
At 1800 hou:rs, Ka.zemi the us coast Gual:d representative, Petty 
Officer summers and advised him to notify captain Talbot by tel~ of the 
serioos nature of the spill :in=i.dent. Ka.zemi requested the us Coast Guard 
to dispatch a bel icopter and captain Talbot to the scene to assess the 
extent ~ cleanup :measures. At 1815 
hours, Ka.zemi :met with J'I:JD:j Moorad an site and she advised him that the 
spill was :fram a crude oil tank (Tank #1256) an Shell's property. Shell 
originally or gallons crude oil leaked from 
the tank to a sto:rmrm.ter ca.mae th:ro.Jgh a NPlJES pennitted 
discharge point identified as EOOJ Shell's NPlJES pennit issued by the 
Regional 
At 1900 hours, 
Fish and Game c::anducted 
bel icopt:er 
of the Department of 
flight in a us Coast Guard 
damage of the spill. '!hey reported 
to Ka.zemi. that the marshlands surrourrli.n;J Peyton Slough -were heavily 
~cted in addition to 
Slough. I.al:ge am::rum::s 
Shell wharf 
shore! ine and tributaries east of Peyton 



























Operations Aoa:lntir:g Division, and Management. '!be 
interviews were of the investigation into the cause of the spill 
incident, and in an effort to establish the facts and eviderx:e needed to 
prepare an enforcement action in :resp::mse to the eve:nt. In addi:tim 
sampl:in;J was performed by Boal:d staff biologists in the impacted area in 
support of the Department of Fish Game's efforts to assess the extent 
of damages. state f\mds fran the state Cleanup and Abatement .Aa:xmTt were 
authorized. by the state water Resooroes Control Board for this pw:pose. 
status 
To date, the Board staff has d.etemi.ned that crude oil was di.sc::h.arged into 
Peyton Slough by fran tank #1256 because they did not 
follow their own written pzooednres establish.ed. for control of spills. In 
a :news release on 1988 Att:achtme:nt Shell in:licated that 





valves, and diked area.) 
prooedu:res for all tanks that call 
storm water system to be closed.'' 
practice deviated from 
and #1257 that " ••• operat:in;J practice 
these two tanks only] to be 
(see Attachment F - drawi.rg of tank, 
In addition, we have drains from all 800 tanks within 
Shell's refine:cy except tanks #1256 and #1257 drain directly to the 
wastewater treatment plant. fact that roof drains discharge directly 






























copies of these records c.onclusions 'l.li'der 
penalty of perju:r.y. (See Attachment H - letter to Shell frcm the Board.) 
Regional Board Enforcement Alternatives 
'!he cal ifomi.a water COde contains two specific sections addressing the 
r:eo::Ner':f of civil m::lt'let.ary liability for oil spill events. 
Section 13350(a) (3) provides that arrx person who causes or permits oil or 
arrx residuary product of petroleum to be deposited in waters of the state 
my be civilly liable. '!he california courts have interpreted this section 
to require proof an or negligent act caused the spill. 
'!his liability may be administratively il'p""'*rl directly by the Regional 
Board or my be referred by the Board to the Attorney General to seek 
rea:Nery by petitioo to the SUperior C':alrt. If the Board elects to 
administratively inp"'!Se the liability, a maximJm of $10 per gallon of 
oil spilled my be assessed. If the Board elects to refer the matter to 
the Attorney General ccmt of civil liability, a maximum 
of $20 per gal be assessed. In determini.ng the 
:many factors 
the spill, the nature of cleanup and the damage 
actual amom"lt of 
includirq the cause 
resul tirg fran the ""to'"' ........ 
Section 13385, as amerrled in 1987, provides that arrx person who violates an 
Nl?DES permit may be civil Shell's NPDES permit contains several 




unfortunately, noJ:::ma.l nl"l!A'I"~"~'""~ 
apparently awroved 
procedures. '!he 
event such that 
state waters if 
written 
Shell personnel and 
their written 








§ 112.3 40 CfR Ch.l h~al Pm~ Apncy 







IEn,tiNfiMMtal Proted&on Agency 
specify another effective date. The 






A:ny parson Who 
eertificaticn in any lNC~ 
~ mmr t.h.iJI 
a:aplian:::ll or ~
161ntififd in  D 
!5. 'Jh1a pimldt 18 :not b:'llnllfC"able 
Pll9iaral !kCd. ~ l!!l!'liilll1"""' 
and rtd.IUNMOO Of 
incatpnate 111\1\Xb ~ X.loliJ:t~~m:& 
water Act. 
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7. waste discharqe at 
d\a:PIOII!II or p:qcead ~ in the 
I. Offioer nvi..., a.rD 
b. 
c. 
efS~fliiC."t1'\i'ta data of thi.s Order, a 
was nvi~ a.rD 
(cleanup) 
the effect 
~lll.tliiS nvillicns llhl::.ul d: 
Evaluate t:lw effctJ.v.-. llr'l..,rt .LEIIM5id..o~.d."'"'- lllf'ld ~ e.:rd 
trtat.e \Ibm tblly ~ •• C~.P~~BrB1~anal 
Pnldict tbl eff.ctiv.- tbl P:utiC.1Md faciliU. 4ll'd ~ 
am provi48 an lllllllntliUc~n ~· ccnt.a.inin; Ultm'im 8.r'd f ina 1 





il!PORT ON PREVENTION J 
PU..NS FOR ACCIDENTAL 8 
VI. PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR CONTAINING AND MINIMIZING 
fFFECTS OF ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE 
A. 
eewers. 
In the East 




B. Process Areas 
In 
C. Loading Areas 
All 
are generally situated 
retain the contents of the 
are diked and acci-
tank not surrounded by dikes for fire pro-
collected on site and contained in the process 
area, tank process-water drainage ia conveyed to 
• Non-contaminated storm water collected 
on aanual control through levee 
to stormwater contaiament basins. All drainage in the 
to process sewer ayatem. 
area accidental spills in process areas are 
common sewer which discharges to Effluent Treating. 
completed in 1966 are located in 
process wastes discharge ~ the process 
Surface water falling in the 
atorm water eavar which discharges 
etorm pond during rain storms. At all times 
box are in the open 
storm water system from 
spills, etc., are 
Gross Oil Separator. 
Moderni-
Surface water 
,. ......... ~"-'"'"'to Plant. Non-
containment basins 
Weat watershed. Spillage 
loading locations would be 
treatment system. 
two loading spots. These two spots 
rack. Liquid sulfur solidifies on 
accidental spillage escaping the 
is in a separate drain 
weak caustic solution 
a sump from which it 
Public Affairs· 









GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, Governor 





c .. above, 
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3. The bases for your estimate of the amount of oil recovered to 
date, including the number of vacuum truckloads received, the 
total volume they contained, and the sampling method used to 
determine the percentage of oil in the trucks. 
This report should be submitted subject to perjury, and is 
requested by May 20, 1988. 
We also request that our staff be given an opportunity to be 
present when the inside of Tank 1256 is inspected so the cause of 
the tank leak can be determined. Please call on Mike Drennan of 
our staff at 464-0699 within two working days of when removal is 
planned. Also please call on Mike if questions arise on these 
requests. 
cc: Mike Rugg, DFG 

